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“[W]e continue to believe that our primary function in statutory 
interpretation is effectuating the legislature’s intent, but we recognize 
that that is often a difficult assignment.”1 
- The Honorable Virginia A. Long, Associate Justice, Supreme Court 
of New Jersey (1999-Present) 
 
“Do not expect anybody’s theory of statutory interpretation, whether 
it is your own or somebody else’s, to be an accurate statement of 
what courts actually do with statutes. The hard truth of the matter is 
that American courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, and 
consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation.”2 
- Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, Law Professors, Harvard 
Law School 
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1 Virginia A. Long, The Purple Thread: Social Justice as a Recurring Theme in the 
Decisions of the Poritz Court, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 533, 538 (2007).    
2 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1169 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey 
eds., 1994).   
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In the lead-up to the hotly contested 2009 governor’s race in New 
Jersey, both sides tried to rally their supporters by mentioning the 
coming Supreme Court3 vacancies. Under the New Jersey Constitution, 
the governor has the power to “nominate and appoint, with the advice 
and consent of the Senate, the Chief Justice and associate justices of the 
Supreme Court . . . .”4 Once confirmed, justices “shall hold their offices 
for initial terms of 7 years and upon reappointment shall hold their 
offices during good behavior . . . [but] shall be retired upon attaining the 
age of 70 years.”5 As a result of the multi-faceted judicial appointment 
system, the newly-elected governor would have the opportunity to fill 
four openings on the seven-member court, which has hardly been a 
passive actor in state government. “For decades, the court, which has 
the final word on interpreting state law and the New Jersey 
Constitution, has been a driving force in New Jersey.”6 Both major 
candidates offered the requisite platitudes associated with their 
respective parties. Republican nominee Chris Christie, however, was 
particularly outspoken in his denunciation of the “activist” court. 
Critical of all the sitting justices, including the Republicans, Christie 
 
3 All references to the “Supreme Court” or to the “court” refer to the New Jersey 
Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court is only referenced in full.    
4 N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 6. 
5 Id. 
6 Mary Fuchs, Next Governor Will Reshape N.J. Supreme Court, STAR LEDGER 
(Newark, N.J.), Oct. 29, 2009, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2009/10/next_nj_ 
governor_could_impact.html.   
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said that none of the justices embodied the type of jurist he would 
appoint. Describing his ideal nominee, Christie said: “I want someone 
who is extraordinarily bright, and I want someone who will interpret the 
laws and the Constitution, not legislate from the bench.”7 Then-
candidate, and now Governor, Christie was referring to an appointment 
in the vein of United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia.8 
Scalia, who along with his colleague Justice Clarence Thomas is a 
constitutional originalist, is perhaps most famous for his outspoken 
textualism. Textualism, as a method of statutory interpretation, 
proclaims: “The text is the law, and it is the text that must be 
observed.”9 Grounded in the theory that the courts are the faithful agents 
of the legislature, textualism frowns upon the use of legislative history 
and rejects the notion that there is a discernable legislative “intent.”10 
In this Article, I demonstrate that in the complex arena of statutory 
interpretation, the situation is not nearly as black and white as Christie 
claims. The Governor may rightfully criticize the court’s constitutional 
jurisprudence for producing purpose-driven, “activist” decisions.11 
However, the court in the past ten years, especially under Chief Justice 
Stuart Rabner, has in fact employed a quasi-textualist approach to 
statutory interpretation. The justices may not adhere to Scalia-like 
textualism12 — especially since legislative “intent” continues to drive 
 
7 Id.; see also Robert P. George, In Replacing Supreme Court Justice John Wallace, NJ 
Gov. Chris Christie Made Good on His Promise, STAR LEDGER (May 9, 2010, 6:14 AM),  
http://blog.nj.com/njv_guest_blog/2010/05/in_replacing_supreme_court_jus.html (quoting 
candidate Christie as saying, “I will remake the court and I will remake it on this one simple 
principle. If you (want to) legislate, (then) run for the Legislature, don’t put on a black robe 
and go to the Supreme Court . . . (T)here won’t be any justices that I either reappoint or put 
on that court that do that.”).    
8 Republican Chris Christie defeated Democratic incumbent Jon Corzine to capture the 
governor’s mansion on November 3, 2009. See David M. Halbfinger & Ian Urbina, 
Republicans Bask in Glow of Victories in N.J. and Va., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/05/nyregion/05elect.html?_r=1.  
9 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 22 
(Amy Gutmann, ed., 1997). 
10 See id. at 31 (“As I have said, I object to the use of legislative history on principle, 
since I reject intent of the legislature as the proper criterion of the law.”). 
11 I do not attempt to address whether or not I agree with the popular critiques of the 
court’s constitutional jurisprudence, but I accept the fact that the court has such a reputation 
for Constitutional “innovation.” 
12 Yet even Scalia’s rigid textualism includes an exception for absurdities. See 
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in judgment) (reaffirming “the venerable principle that if the language of a 
statute is clear, that language must be given effect — at least in the absence of a patent 
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the court’s statutory decisions, which are filled with references to 
legislative history — but neither are they flagrantly disregarding the 
text. The court’s general reputation for policy-driven activism and 
innovation13 is just not as applicable to its statutory jurisprudence. 
In my study of the court, I compared the final six years of the 
Poritz Court to the first three years of the Rabner Court, disregarding 
the cases decided during the brief tenure of Chief Justice James R. 
Zazzali.14 Deborah Poritz, who was nominated to the court by 
Republican Governor Christine Todd Whitman and then re-nominated 
by Democratic Governor James McGreevey following the completion 
of her initial seven-year term, served as Chief Justice from 1996 to 
2006.15 The first female Attorney General of New Jersey, Poritz earlier 
served as chief counsel to Republican Governor Thomas Kean.16 Stuart 
Rabner, who was nominated to the court by Democratic Governor John 
Corzine, began his current tenure as Chief Justice in 2007. Rabner 
previously served as Corzine’s chief counsel and Attorney General.17 
Although slight, there is a perceptible shift between the more purpose-
driven Poritz Court and the more textually-anchored Rabner Court. Yet 
neither court has exhibited the same degree of purposivism that 
animated earlier constitutional decisions, such as Abbott18 and Mount 
 
absurdity”) (emphasis added)). For a more complete discussion of Scalia’s concurrence in 
the case, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 621-23 
(1990) [hereinafter Eskridge, The New Textualism]. 
13 For a brief discussion of the development of judicial activism on the New Jersey 
Supreme Court, see CHARLES S. LOPEMAN, THE ACTIVIST ADVOCATE: POLICY MAKING IN 
STATE SUPREME COURTS 119 (1999) (describing the influence of New Jersey Supreme Court 
Chief Justice Vanderbilt in the development of a judicial philosophy of activism that 
permeated the New Jersey Supreme Court and survived his retirement to influence future 
justices). According to Lopeman, “[j]udicial policy making by the New Jersey court is now 
an integral part of the state’s governing apparatus.” Id. (citation omitted).   
14 Justice James R. Zazzali served as Chief Justice for one year between Chief Justices 
Poritz and Rabner. See David W. Chen, Corzine Elevates a Supreme Court Justice and Taps 
Another Judge to Succeed Him, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2006, http://travel.nytimes.com/2006 
/09/22/nyregion/22court.html?scp=6&sq=zazzali&st=cse (“By elevating Justice Zazzali, 
who turns 70 next June, Mr. Corzine is effectively giving himself more time to pick a new 
chief justice.”). 
15 See Biography: Deborah T. Poritz, DRINKERBIDDLE, http://www.drinkerbiddle.com 
/dporitz/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2011); see also Michael Booth, Avoiding Constitutional 
Confrontation, Governor Renominates Poritz as Chief Decision Allays Fears of Loss of 
Judiciary’s Independence, 172 N.J. L.J. 341 (2003).  
16 See Biography: Deborah T. Poritz, supra note 15. 
17 See Chief Justice Stuart Rabner, N.J. JUDICIARY, http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us 
/supreme/rabner.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2011). 
18 Abbott v. Burke, 100 N.J. 269 (1985). For a brief history of the landmark education 
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Laurel,19 which have brought such acclaim and notoriety to the New 
Jersey Supreme Court.20 In fact, throughout the past decade, the court 
has been carrying out a remarkably similar version of the more 
measured approach to statutory interpretation that was first ascribed to 
New Jersey courts in an editorial note in the 1954 Rutgers Law Review.21 
Addressing the use of extrinsic aids, which generally consisted of 
different forms of legislative history,22 the author concluded that the 
consultation of such sources depended on an initial finding of statutory 
ambiguity.23 Although the author noted that “the test of ambiguity [was] 
not a hard and fast rule”24 and that the courts did not shy away from 
considering such extrinsic sources strictly as a means of corroboration,25 
the need to first identify textual ambiguity still functioned as a focal 
 
case that has spanned three decades, see History of Abbott, EDUC. LAW CENTER, 
http://www.edlawcenter.org/ELCPublic/AbbottvBurke/AbbottHistory.htm (last visited Apr. 
20, 2011).   
19 S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151 (1975). For a brief 
history of the groundbreaking affordable housing case, see History of the Mount Laurel 
Decisions, N.J. DIGITAL LEGAL LIBR., http://njlegallib.rutgers.edu/mtlaurel/aboutmtlaurel 
.php (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).   
20 See David Voreacos & Terrence Dopp, N.J. Supreme Court Weighs School Cuts 
Amid Impasse, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK., Jan. 5, 2011, http://www.businessweek.com/news 
/2011-01-05/n-j-supreme-court-weighs-school-cuts-amid-impasse.html (“New Jersey’s top 
court . . . developed a reputation for liberal decisions through such cases as the so-called 
Mount Laurel rulings. In that decision, the justices held that zoning that resulted in 
exclusion of minorities was the same as racial discrimination.”). 
21 See Serena Perretti Bowen, Editorial Notes, Extrinsic Aids to Statutory Interpretation 
— The New Jersey View, 8 RUTGERS L. REV. 486, 486 (1954) (arguing that the New Jersey 
courts at all levels did not accept “[t]he radical view” that rejected “the plain meaning rule 
and permit[ted] the admission of extrinsic aids even if they raise[d] an ambiguity in an 
otherwise clear statute”). For more general discussions of the New Jersey court system’s 
handling of statutory cases, see C. Dallas Sands, Developments in the Field of Legislation, 
10 RUTGERS L. REV. 2 (1955) (discussing different theories of statutory interpretation 
adopted by judges at all levels of the New Jersey judiciary) and GEORGE STILES HARRIS, 
CASES ON STATUTES OF NEW JERSEY (1925) (providing early statutory case citations with 
brief explanations).    
22 Bowen addresses: “Journals of the Legislature;” “Amendments Made During 
Consideration of the Original Bill;” “Committee Reports;” “Debates;” “Constitutional 
History;” “Introducer’s Statement;” “Testimony of a Legislator;” “Commission and Agency 
Reports;” “Message of the Executive;” “Title and Marginal Notes;” and “Preamble.”  See 
Bowen, supra note 21.  
23 See id. at 500 (“The admission of extrinsic aids to the interpretation of statutes in 
New Jersey seems to rest on a preliminary finding by the court that the statute is 
ambiguous.”).   
24 Id.  
25 Id. (“Despite the fact that a statute has been found to be clear, the courts have 
considered the extrinsic materials and used them as a corroboration of the interpretation.”).   
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point of the interpretive process. 
In order to compare and analyze the court’s statutory jurisprudence 
under the two chief justices, I focused on the role of legislative history.26 
Legislative history is particularly illuminating because of its 
controversial role27 in statutory opinions as a flashpoint that tends to 
divide conservative textualists28 and more liberal, purpose-driven 
jurists.29 In the most comprehensive study to date of the United States 
Supreme Court’s use of legislative history, David S. Law and David 
 
26 For a timeline of the role legislative history has played in the United States, primarily 
in the United States Supreme Court, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 208-29 (1994).  [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION]. In her 1954 Note, Bowen differentiates between legislative history at the 
federal level, which she argues “refers to the process through which a bill goes from its 
introduction to its passage,” and New Jersey’s definition of legislative history, which she 
argues “is the legal history of the statute, i.e. previous statutes on the same subject.” Bowen, 
supra note 21, at 487 (citations omitted). Yet the current court, under both chief justices, 
generally relies upon what Bowen would refer to as legislative history at the federal level. 
See, e.g., Owens v. Feigin, 194 N.J. 607 (2008) (referencing signing statements, Senate 
Judiciary Committee Statement, sponsors’ statement, and gubernatorial signing statement); 
Serrano v. Serrano, 183 N.J. 508 (2005) (reviewing sponsors’ statement, gubernatorial 
conditional veto, and meeting of the Joint Committee on Automobile Insurance Reform). 
Thus my coding for legislative history combines the two concepts, except in instances in 
which the court specifically resorts to the separately coded judicial canon of construction in 
pari materia to analyze earlier statutes on the same or related topic. See, e.g., State v. 
Hodde, 181 N.J. 375, 379 (2004) (“Statutory provisions, however, cannot be read in 
isolation. They must be construed in concert with other legislative pronouncements on the 
same subject matter so as to give full effect to each constituent part of an overall legislative 
scheme.” (citations omitted)).  
27 See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative 
History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117, 119 
(2008) (“Critics of legislative history have long maintained that it lacks neutrality as an 
interpretive resource. Unlike the dictionary or the canons of construction, committee reports 
and floor statements are produced by partisans — actors with a stake in the legislative 
contest to which they are contributing.”); see also OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: 
A RE-EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
(1989) (attacking certain uses of legislative history by highlighting the theoretical 
weaknesses of intentionalism); Alex Kozinski, Should Reading Legislative History be an 
Impeachable Offense?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 807, 812 (1998) (describing the “widespread 
misuse of legislative history to achieve substantive ends”).   
28 See Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE 
L.J. 371 (decrying excessive reliance on legislative history by fellow judges). 
29 Differentiating between text-oriented judges and purpose/consequence judges, United 
States Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer notes that the former try to avoid making use 
of “the legislative debates that compose the history of the statute’s enactment in Congress.” 
STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 89 (2010) [hereinafter 
BREYER, DEMOCRACY WORK]. 
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Zaring found that ideology is a crucial factor in determining whether or 
not a Justice will cite legislative history.30 Although legal concerns 
regarding a statute’s form and content were the primary forces driving 
legislative history citations, the liberal Justices still relied upon 
legislative history more often than their conservative counterparts.31 
Justice Scalia, a conservative textualist, opposes the use of legislative 
history32 because it is not subject to Article I, Section VII’s 
bicameralism and presentment requirement33 and therefore is not law.34 
Scalia has not been shy about voting with the majority on the outcome 
of the case but writing a separate concurrence voicing his displeasure 
with the majority’s use of legislative history in reaching its decision.35 
Justice Breyer, Scalia’s intellectual and ideological counterweight, on 
 
30 See David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and the 
Use of Legislative History, 51 WM. AND MARY L. REV. 1653 (2010). 
31 Id. at 1739 (confirming what earlier studies have found: “liberal Justices are generally 
more inclined than conservative Justices to make use of legislative history.”). 
32 In spite of his trenchant criticism of legislative history, Justice Scalia has been more 
than willing to sign on to conservative opinions that include extensive references to 
legislative history. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 
(2000) (signing on to the O’Connor majority opinion’s use of legislative history in the form 
of the “rejected proposal rule”). See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 27, at 117 
(“Intriguingly, Justice Scalia’s strong resistance to legislative history when used by liberal 
Justices does not extend to majorities authored by his conservative colleagues.”).      
33 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President 
of the United States[.]”). 
34 See SCALIA, supra note 9, at 35 (arguing that unlike legislative history, such as 
committee reports, a statute “has a claim to our attention simply because Article I, section 7 
of the Constitution provides that since it has been passed by the prescribed majority . . . it is 
law”); see also Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We are 
here to apply the statute, not legislative history, and certainly not the absence of legislative 
history. Statutes are the law . . . .”). Justice Scalia is not alone; his primary conservative 
partner in advocating this viewpoint is the Honorable Frank H. Easterbrook, Chief Judge of 
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. See In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 
1989) (“The Constitution establishes a complex set of procedures, including presidential 
approval (or support by two-thirds of each house). It would demean the constitutionally 
prescribed method of legislating to suppose that its elaborate apparatus for deliberation on, 
amending, and approving a text is just a way to create some evidence about the law, while 
the real source of legal rules is the mental process of legislators.”). 
35 See, e.g., Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 219 (1994) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“I join all except Parts III-B, IV, and V 
of the Court’s opinion. The first of these consists of a discussion of the legislative history of 
the Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977 . . . . I find that discussion 
unnecessary to the decision. It serves to maintain the illusion that legislative history is an 
important factor in this Court’s deciding of cases, as opposed to an omnipresent makeweight 
for decisions arrived at on other grounds.” (citations omitted)).   
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the other hand, has been the United States Supreme Court’s most vocal 
supporter of the use of legislative history.36 In his most recent book, 
Justice Breyer argues that judges interpreting statutes can look to “a 
wide range of relevant legislative materials.”37 Although not advocating 
for the use of legislative history in every case, Breyer argues that it can 
be very helpful in discerning the meaning of statutes in difficult cases.38 
He explains that most of the cases that reach the Supreme Court involve 
complicated statutory language and therefore benefit from judicial 
consultation of legislative history.39 
This Article also focuses on legislative history because of how 
easily accessible it is to New Jersey Supreme Court justices and their 
clerks.40 According to a forthcoming study by recent Yale Law School 
graduate and current D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Clerk Brian Barnes, 
New Jersey is one of a minority of states that makes such material 
accessible on-line.41 Even prior to the rise of the Internet, the State 
 
36 See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992) [hereinafter Breyer, Legislative History] (providing examples of 
the usefulness of legislative history in rendering decisions).   
37 BREYER, DEMOCRACY WORK, supra note 29, at 92. 
38 See Breyer, Legislative History, supra note 36, at 848 (“Using legislative history to 
help interpret unclear statutory language seems natural. Legislative history helps a court 
understand the context and purpose of a statute.”). For a more in-depth discussion of Justice 
Breyer’s views on statutory interpretation, see STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: 
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 85-110 (2005). 
39 See BREYER, DEMOCRACY WORK, supra note 29, at 88. A number of scholars have 
attempted to trace the ebb and flow of legislative history references in Supreme Court 
decisions. Compare Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History 
in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. 
L. REV. 277 (noting a marked decline over the past decade in the use of legislative history in 
statutory interpretation decisions), with Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of 
Legislative History in the Supreme Court, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 205 (describing the success of 
Justices Breyer and Stevens in combating Scalia’s attempted purge of legislative history).   
40 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILLIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, 
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 304 (2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter EFG 
LEGISLATION] (exploring potential criteria for using legislative history, the authors write: “A 
moderate position would be that legislative history should be consulted only if it is readily 
available to the average lawyer” and “can be routinely discerned by interpreters at 
reasonable cost” (citations omitted)). 
41 See Brian Barnes, The Transformation of State Statutory Interpretation (May 28, 
2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). The New Jersey State Library’s 
website contains complete legislative histories dating back to 1998 and is currently in the 
process of scanning and updating legislative histories from 1974-1997. See Legislative 
Histories, N.J. STATE LIBR., http://law.njstatelib.org/njlh (last visited Apr. 26, 2011). New 
Jersey and Illinois are the only two states “to retrospectively make previously public 
materials electronically accessible.” Barnes, supra, at 16 n.80 (citations omitted).   
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Library was busy compiling in-depth legislative materials in hard copy. 
Barnes found that the rather inclusive records contain (where 
applicable) statements of intent, committee statements, floor 
amendments, and gubernatorial veto messages or press releases. From a 
comparative standpoint, New Jersey’s legislature is one of only twelve 
in the nation that generates committee reports similar to those created 
by congressional standing committees.42 New Jersey is also only one of 
twenty-nine states that maintains records of floor proceedings43 and one 
of twenty-eight states that records or transcribes committee hearings.44 
Thus the absence of any references to legislative history in New Jersey 
Supreme Court opinions cannot be attributed to inaccessibility.45 
Yet the State Library’s maintenance of such comprehensive 
records inevitably leads justices to consider the relative interpretive 
value of different forms of legislative history. Committee statements 
and floor amendments, for example, are both part of the legislative 
process as it takes place in “real time,” but the former purportedly 
represents the views of multiple members whereas individual 
representatives often introduce the latter. A gubernatorial veto message, 
on the other hand, is generated after the bill has already passed both 
houses and thus is not contemporaneous with the actual legislative 
debate. Should it be afforded less weight? Although it is beyond the 
scope of this Article to address what types of legislative history were 
available to the justices in each case, the Appendix lists the different 
forms of legislative history referenced in each majority opinion in order 
to provide a baseline for further research.46 
This Article contains seven Parts. Part I offers a brief overview of 
the dominant theories in the field of statutory interpretation, with an 
emphasis on the role of legislative history. Part II addresses the 
development of the modern New Jersey judiciary system, beginning 
 
42 See Barnes, supra note 41, at 6. New Jersey is also the only state that makes its 
standing committee reports dating back to 1980 electronically accessible. The other states 
with such reports online only provide more recent ones. See id. at 7.     
43 See id. at 9.   
44 See id. at 12.   
45 If not yet available on-line, the New Jersey State Library has hard copies of all 
codified enactments dating back to the early 1970s. See WILLIAM H. MANZ, GUIDE TO STATE 
LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE MATERIALS 267 (7th ed. 2008). 
46 See Appendix. For a hierarchy of legislative history sources, see The New Textualism, 
supra note 12, at 636-40 (listing from most authoritative to least authoritative: Committee 
Reports; Sponsor Statements; Rejected Proposals; Floor & Hearing Colloquy; Non-
legislator Drafters and Sponsors; Legislative Silence and Subsequent History). 
YOFFIE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2011  7:35 PM 
2011 NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT 311 
with the adoption of the state’s current Constitution in 1947. Part III 
considers the relative lack of statutory interpretation scholarship at the 
state level and Columbia Law Professor Abbe R. Gluck’s theory of 
“Modified Textualism.” Outlined in Gluck’s recent Yale Law Journal 
article, “Modified Textualism” is a rigid hierarchical method of 
statutory interpretation that attempts to find common ground between 
textualism and purposivism.47 Part IV advances an explanation for the 
Poritz Court’s approach to statutory interpretation during the first half 
of the decade, and Part V analyzes the statutory jurisprudence of the 
Rabner Court. Part VI discusses the general institutional factors 
influencing the Rabner Court’s decision-making process and potential 
areas for future research. Part VII comments on the brief and moderate 
tenure of former New Jersey Supreme Court Justice William J. 
Brennan, Jr. and delves into the broader strategic and normative 
question regarding the importance of decisional outcome versus 
interpretive methodology. 
I. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION & THE ROLE OF 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
The significance of the court’s approach to statutory interpretation 
is best captured by the work of former Yale Law School Dean and 
current Second Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Guido Calabresi. In A 
Common Law for the Age of Statutes, Calabresi observed that during the 
twentieth century, “we have gone from a legal system dominated by the 
common law . . . to one in which statutes . . . have become the primary 
source of law.”48 The New Jersey court system, including the supreme 
court, is no exception. In his 1955 Rutgers Law Review article, 
Developments in the Field of Legislation, Professor C. Dallas Sands 
noted the relatively low number of “strictly ‘common law’ cases” and 
the strikingly high percentage of statutory cases decided by the New 
Jersey courts.49 Thus prior to delving into New Jersey Supreme Court 
 
47 See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: 
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750 (2010) 
[hereinafter Gluck, States as Laboratories]. 
48 GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982) (emphasis 
added).    
49 See Sands, supra note 21, at 14 (“Statistics establish that the business of determining 
and declaring the operative effect of written law is a major vocation of the New Jersey 
courts. . . . Among 483 decisions reported with opinions (including per curiam opinions 
wherever they stated the grounds of decision) during the past year, only 113 were strictly 
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cases, it is important to address different theories and methods of 
statutory interpretation advanced by leading legislation scholars. 
Although current scholarship is almost exclusively based on United 
States Supreme Court case law, the justices in Trenton are engaged in 
statutory interpretation nearly every day and inevitably encounter many 
of the same statutory questions faced by their counterparts on the United 
States Supreme Court. 
Unfortunately, even if a newly confirmed New Jersey Supreme 
Court justice were inclined to adopt a so-called dominant theory of 
interpretation, she would soon realize that there is far from universal 
agreement within the academy. There is even less of a consensus over 
the proper nomenclature. Whereas some scholars focus on New 
Textualism, Intentionalism, and Pragmatism,50 others discuss 
Textualism, Purposivism, and Intentionalism.51 Based on a review of the 
scholarly literature and analysis of New Jersey Supreme Court statutory 
decisions over the past decade, the most relevant theory is 
Intentionalism, followed by a combination of Textualism and 
Purposivism. Unlike Textualism, however, which in its most basic form 
prescribes a text-based method of interpretation, Intentionalism and 
Purposivism suggest interpretive objectives that do not necessarily 
require specific judicial maneuvers. Yet even Textualism is subject to 
interpretive variations. 
A. Textualism & Modified Textualism 
Textualism revolves around the primacy of the statute’s text, 
grounded in the opacity and complexity of the legislative process.52 The 
exact language of a statute may have been the key to ensuring its 
passage and thus textualism calls on judges to focus on the text itself.53 
But more importantly, from a theoretical perspective, textualists are 
 
‘common law’ cases in the sense that they involved no apparent issues of written law. By 
way of contrast there were 370, or nearly three-fourths of the cases (not counting 
constitutional law cases), which involved written-law issues in one form or another.”).  
50 See Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. 
L.J. 341 (2010). 
51 See Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, The 
Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 
2011). 
52 See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 450 
(2005). 
53 See id.  
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skeptical of judges’ attempt to divine legislative “intent.” According to 
leading textual scholar John Manning, legislatures comprised of 
multiple representatives do not share an unexpressed intent on contested 
issues.54 United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia sums up 
this viewpoint when he writes: “It is the law that governs, not the intent 
of the lawgiver.”55 Instead of trying to divine the legislature’s 
“subjective” intent, textualists aim to identify “a sort of ‘objectified’ 
intent — the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text 
of the law . . . .”56 The quest for a so-called “objectified” intent leads 
textualists to scorn the use of legislative history and instead rely on 
judicially-crafted cannons of statutory interpretation to help them decide 
difficult cases.57 
Like any theory, textualism has evolved over time. 58 And just like 
any theory’s believers, textualism’s adherents fall at different points 
along the text-based spectrum. Traditional textualism was grounded in 
the “plain meaning rule” in which the text was the best indicator of a 
statute’s meaning, but the legislative history was consulted for 
confirmation.59 “New Textualism,” on the other hand, advances a 
“harder plain meaning rule.”60 Championed by Justice Scalia, “New 
Textualism” represents a significant shift in the use of legislative 
history. By the end of Scalia’s second term, the United States Supreme 
Court had nearly halved the number of instances in which it looked to 
legislative history to confirm the plain meaning of a statute.61 The text 
 
54 Id. at 420 (“[M]ulti-member legislatures do not have an actual but unexpressed 
‘intent’ on any materially contested interpretive point . . . .” (citations omitted)).  
55 SCALIA, supra note 9, at 17. 
56 Id. (emphasis added). 
57 Id. at 29-30 (“My view that the objective indication of the words, rather than the 
intent of the legislature, is what constitutes the law leads me, of course, to the conclusion 
that legislative history should not be used as an authoritative indication of a statute’s 
meaning.”); see also Eskridge, The New Textualism, supra note 12, at 643 (describing the 
work of leading New Textualist Frank Easterbrook as “assert[ing] that judges’ reliance on 
legislative history to discern legislative intent amounts to nothing more than ‘wild guesses’” 
(citing Frank Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 548 (1983))).   
58 For a historical overview of textualism, see Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of 
Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5-43 (2006) (discussing different aspects of textualism, 
including “Textualism’s Roots;” “Textualism’s Precursors;” “The Emergence of Modern 
Textualism;” “Textualism’s Reign;” and “Textualism’s Missteps”). 
59 William Eskridge has argued that “the plain meaning rule has traditionally been a 
‘soft’ rule — the plainest meaning can be trumped by contradictory legislative history.” 
Eskridge, The New Textualism, supra note 12, at 626 (citations omitted). 
60 Id. at 656. 
61 Id. at 657 (noting a decrease from eighteen instances in the 1986 Term when Justice 
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became truly paramount and legislative history did not necessarily have 
any role to play.62 Although extreme in terms of its disregard for 
legislative history,63 “New Textualism” embraces context,64 especially in 
regards to statutory structure,65 and select canons of judicial 
construction.66 
New Textualism may be influential on the nation’s highest court,67 
but Abbe Gluck argues that “Modified Textualism” is more influential 
on some of the states’ highest courts. Discussed in greater detail in Part 
III, infra, “Modified Textualism” also focuses on the primacy of the text 
and does not permit citations to legislative history for the sole purpose 
of confirmation.68 Yet in the presence of textual ambiguity,69 which even 
 
Scalia joined the United States Supreme Court to eleven instances in the 1988 Term in 
which legislative history was used to confirm a statute’s plain meaning).   
62 Id. at 658 (“More recent opinions of the [United States Supreme] Court by Justices 
sympathetic to the new textualism are more rigid: Not only does the Court not begrudge 
legislative history any legitimate role, but the Court does not even stoop to analyze 
legislative history arguments.”).   
63 That being said, Scalia has not uniformly abstained from consulting legislative 
history. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J. 
concurring) (allowing for potential absurdity to justify the consultation of “all public 
materials, including the background of [the rule] and the legislative history of its adoption” 
(emphasis added)). 
64 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 
1509, 1532 (1998) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW (1997)) (“It is a truism that interpreting a text requires context. Scalia 
seeks to turn this truth to his advantage.”).   
65 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 64 (1994) (“Because interpretation is a social enterprise, 
because words have no natural meanings, and because their effect lies in context, we must 
consult these contexts.”).   
66 See Eskridge, The New Textualism, supra note 12, at 663 (resorting to substantive 
policy canons reluctantly, the new textualists “seek a revival of canons that rest upon 
precepts of grammar and logic, proceduralism, and federalism”).   
67 But see Elliot M. Davis, Note, The Newer Textualism: Justice Alito’s Statutory 
Interpretation, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 983, 983-84 (2007) (arguing that Justice Alito’s 
“newer textualism,” which does not advocate for the categorical exclusion of legislative 
history, is more likely to have a greater influence on the United States Supreme Court’s 
statutory jurisprudence in the coming years).   
68 See Gluck, States as Laboratories, supra note 47, at 1758 (“Modified textualism has 
two salient differences from the original: it ranks interpretive tools in a clear order — 
textual analysis, then legislative history, then default judicial presumptions — and it 
includes legislative history in the hierarchy.”).  
69 For a critique of “Modified Textualism,” see Ethan J. Leib & Michael Serota, The 
Costs of Consensus in Statutory Construction, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 47, 60 (2010), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/7/30/leib_serota.html (“The unwillingness of modified 
textualism to allow legislative history to be utilized for confirmatory rather than 
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Scalia recognizes does occur on occasion,70 judges will resort to 
legislative history to attempt to divine a statute’s meaning.71 If, and only 
if, the legislative history does not provide clarity, the judges will next 
turn to judicial canons of statutory construction.72 Gluck may disagree 
with the New Textualists about the role of legislative history, but she is 
in agreement with them over intentionalism’s relative lack of 
importance. According to Gluck, the current divide is between 
textualism and purposivism.73 Yet her broad strokes obscure the fine 
differences between intentionalism and purposivism — the former of 
which has a far greater impact on the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 
statutory jurisprudence. 
B. Intentionalism74 & The Funnel of Abstraction75 
The quest for statutory intent by American judges can be traced all 
the way back to John Marshall. Unwilling to limit the United States 
Supreme Court’s interpretive toolbox to strict textualism, but 
uncomfortable with the exercise of unrestrained equitable powers, 
Marshall aimed to strike a balance by focusing on discerning legislative 
intent.76 Victoria Nourse, a legal scholar and Obama nominee to the 
 
expansionary uses is a quite substantial cost that may very well impair decisionmaking in 
easy cases.”).   
70 See United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 307-08 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(finding the language of 18 U.S.C. § 5037(c)(1)(B) to be ambiguous). 
71 See Gluck, States as Laboratories, supra note 47, at 1758. 
72 See id.   
73 See id. at 1762 (devoting Part I, Section A to the methodological debate of 
“Textualism Versus Purposivism”).    
74 For a broader and more theoretical discussion of intentionalism, see ESKRIDGE, 
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 26, at 14-25; see also FRANK B. CROSS, 
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 59 (2009) (noting that under 
intentionalism, “the court’s objective should be to ascertain the legislature’s intent 
underlying the statute and ideally how the legislature would have intended this particular 
statutory interpretation case to be decided”). 
75 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as 
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 353 (1990) [hereinafter Eskridge & Frickey, 
Practical Reasoning]. 
76 See John Choon Yoo, Note, Marshall’s Plan: The Early Supreme Court and Statutory 
Interpretation, 101 YALE L.J. 1607, 1615 (1992). For a more recent example from the New 
Jersey Supreme Court, see Michael Booth, Zazzali, Named Chief Justice, Says He’s a 
Realist about Caretaker Term, N.J. L.J., Sept. 25, 2006 (taking issue with critics who claim 
judges legislate from the bench, former New Jersey Supreme Court Chief Justice said upon 
his elevation from Associate Justice to Chief Justice: “That’s an incorrect perception . . . 
Above all the Court seeks to determine what the Legislature intended. The Court makes 
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Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,77 writes that such intentionalism 
carried into the twentieth century. According to Nourse, for most of the 
past century, courts were generally expected to handle statutory 
interpretation cases by searching for the legislature’s intent.78 Courts 
employed an “eclectic” approach that generally included looking at the 
statute’s text and legislative history.79 In their leading textbook on 
statutory interpretation, William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey, and 
Elizabeth Garrett add that the eclectic approach included more than just 
text and legislative history: courts would examine “the statute’s text, 
canons of statutory interpretation, the common law, the circumstances 
of enactment, principles of equity, and so forth.”80 Regardless of how 
exhaustive the list of extrinsic sources may be, legislative history is a 
crucial component of any form of intentionalism. From an 
intentionalist’s perspective, it would only seem strange for judges not to 
look to the legislative materials that accompany the statute in question.81 
Intentionalists resort to extrinsic sources because they fundamentally 
believe that a legislative majority, like an individual person, can have 
“coherent, but unexpressed background intentions” that can inform the 
meaning of their statutorily-uttered words.82 
Intentionalist-eclecticism is best understood through the prism of 
the Eskridge/Frickey Funnel of Abstraction.83 The two scholars move 
 
painstaking efforts to divine the legislative intent”). 
77 See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, President Obama Names 
Victoria F. Nourse to U.S. Court of Appeals (July 14, 2010), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-obama-names-victoria-f-nourse-us-
court-appeals; see also Larry Sandler, Obama Again Nominates Butler to Federal Bench, J. 
SENTINEL (Milwaukee), Jan. 5, 2011, http://www.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/ 
112973059.html (announcing Obama’s re-nomination of Nourse to the Seventh Circuit 
following the Senate’s failure to vote on her appointment during the 111th Congress). 
78 See Nourse, supra note 51; see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILLIP P. FRICKEY & 
ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE 
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 691, 998 (4th ed. 2007) [hereinafter EFG CASES] (“American 
courts in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries generally proclaimed their fidelity to 
legislative ‘intent’ . . . .” (citations omitted)).  
79 See Nourse, supra note 51.  
80 See EFG CASES, supra note 78, at 691 (citations omitted).  
81 See id. at 58.    
82 See Manning, supra note 52, at 423-24. 
83 It is worth noting that Eskridge and Frickey do not view their Funnel of Abstraction 
as an extension of intentionalism but rather as a concrete representation of “Aristotle’s 
theory of practical reasoning.” Eskridge & Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 75, at 
323. The authors actually dismiss the three grand theories of statutory interpretation 
(intentionalism, purposivism, and textualism) before advancing their “positive model of 
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away from the grand theory of intentionalism to advance a methodology 
for statutory interpretation that takes into account the competing values 
influencing judicial decision-making. Building on the complexity of 
human reasoning, Eskridge and Frickey describe a nonlinear approach 
in which the problem solver takes into consideration all of the potential 
solutions and then weighs them against his internal value system.84 
Legal arguments, they posit, are like cables in that the arguments are 
strongest when they weave together as multiple threads85 — threads that 
do not operate in a vacuum but rather interact with one another.86 The 
different threads, however, are not equal in strength. Although their 
relative value will depend upon the nature of the statute under 
consideration, their base values are generally established from the 
outset. Thus a textual thread may not determine the outcome all by 
itself, but it starts off as more influential than a general-purpose thread.87 
Eskridge and Frickey divide these threads into three broad categories 
that judges look to when rendering their interpretation. On a spectrum 
ranging from the funnel’s more concrete base to its more abstract 
mouth, the categories include “Textual Considerations,”88 “Historical 
Considerations,”89 and “Evolutive Considerations.”90 Regardless of how 
 
practical reasoning.” Id. at 345. Yet I am including their model in my discussion of 
intentionalism because it’s pragmatism does not fit as well with the rigidity of textualism or 
the more free-flowing approach of purposivism. As will be discussed infra, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court has been moving towards a textually-anchored funnel of abstraction 
approach to statutory interpretation under the overarching, theoretical umbrella of 
intentionalism.   
84 Id. at 348 (“When solving a problem, we tend to test different solutions, evaluating 
each against a range of values and beliefs we hold as important.”). Eskridge and Frickey 
simply recognize the reality that judges cannot completely prevent their own values and 
beliefs from influencing their statutory decisions.     
85 See id. at 351 (building on the work of CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, 5 COLLECTED 
PAPERS para. 264 (C. Hartshorne & P. Weiss eds., 1960)). 
86 Id. at 351.   
87 Id. (“For most of the [United States] Supreme Court Justices, a persuasive textual 
argument is a stronger thread than an otherwise equally persuasive current policy or fairness 
argument, because of the reliance and legislative supremacy values implicated in following 
the clear statutory text.” (footnote omitted)).  
88 Id. at 354 (“Our practical reasoning model starts with the prevailing Supreme Court 
assumption that the statutory text is the most authoritative interpretive criterion.”).    
89 Eskridge & Frickey, Practical Reasoning, at 356 (“In accordance with the [United 
States Supreme] Court’s practice, our practical reasoning model also considers the original 
expectations of the Congress that enacted the statute,” which is best represented by 
legislative history, followed by legislative purpose).    
90 Id. at 358 (“These are highly abstract inquiries having less connection to text and 
legislative expectations, and hence less authority in a democracy. Yet these inquiries are 
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one groups the different categories, the key is that the interpreter moves 
back and forth along the funnel-shaped spectrum,91 reviewing and 
passing judgment on the varying sources.92 
C. Purposivism 
Former President of the Israeli Supreme Court and world-
renowned jurist Aharon Barak writes: “[e]very statute has a purpose, 
without which it is meaningless.”93 Comprised of both objective and 
subjective factors, such purpose is often difficult for a judge to discern.94 
According to Eskridge, Frickey, and Garret, the theory of purposivism 
is actually a manifestation of legislative intent, which can be divided 
into three separate categories.95 In addition to “specific intent”96 and 
“imaginative reconstruction,”97 the authors also include “purposivism,” 
which is a bit more abstract and speaks to the legislature’s “general 
intent.”98 The theory is attributed to Legal Process scholars Henry M. 
Hart and Albert M. Sacks, both former Harvard Law School professors. 
 
pertinent, because the enactment of statutes is part of a dynamic process.” (footnotes 
omitted)). The authors define this category as “social and legal consequences not anticipated 
when the statute was enacted” and “current values, such as ideas of fairness, related 
statutory policies, and (most important) constitutional values.” Id. at 359.  
91 The spectrum is superimposed against a theoretical funnel, which the authors chose 
for the following reasons:  
First, the model suggests the hierarchy of sources that the Court has in fact 
assumed . . . Second, the model suggests the degree of abstraction of each 
source . . . Third, the model illustrates the pragmatistic and hermeneutical 
insights explained above: In formulating and testing her understanding of the 
statute, the interpreter will move up and down the diagram, evaluating and 
comparing the different considerations represented by each source of 
argumentation.  
Id. at 353-54. 
92 Id. at 354. 
93 AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 136 (2006) (arguing that this purpose 
“is made up of the objectives, the goals, the interests, the values, the policy, and the function 
that the statute is designed to actualize”). 
94 See id. 
95 EFG LEGISLATION, supra note 40, at 222 (“The trouble starts when you try to 
determine what is meant by legislative intent . . . .”).   
96 Id. (explaining the specific intent of legislators as “how they actually decided a 
particular issue of statutory scope or application”). 
97 Id. (explaining imaginative reconstruction as “what the legislators would have 
decided had they thought about the issue”).   
98 Id. at 229 (“Purposivism sets the originalist inquiry at a higher level of generality. It 
asks, ‘What was the statute’s goal?’ rather than ‘What did the drafters specifically 
intend?”‘).  
YOFFIE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2011  7:35 PM 
2011 NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT 319 
Citing Hart and Sacks’ seminal work, Nourse writes that in the “post-
war” era, the two eminent professors taught their law students to 
“‘[d]ecide what purpose ought to be attributed to the statute . . . and then 
[to] . . . [i]nterpret the words of the statute immediately in question so as 
to carry out the purpose as best it can . . . .”‘99 The leading proponents 
on the modern United States Supreme Court are Justice Stephen Breyer 
and recently retired Justice Paul Stevens.100 Unlike textualists, who view 
themselves as the faithful agents of the legislature, purposivists envision 
a more collaborative partnership in which the judges work together with 
the legislators to determine statutory meaning.101 As equal, or at least 
near-equal partners, purposivists are able to take on a more assertive 
role when interpreting statutes. Legislative history, moreover, forms the 
foundation of their “interaction” with legislators and thus purposivists 
generally do not limit themselves to the statutory text. As Professor 
Abbe Gluck observes, there are many different types of purposivists, 
but they all share a willingness to consult a broad array of sources to 
determine statutory meaning and to bend “formalistic methodological 
rules.”102 In the end, legislative “purpose” provides judges with the best 
opportunity to claim the mantle of intent while utilizing legislative 
history to advance their own policy goals.103 
II. EVOLUTION OF “JERSEY JUSTICE:” 104 A 
CONSTITUTIONAL STORY 
Prior to the adoption of the 1947 state constitution, the New Jersey 
judiciary was plagued with problems.105 The poorly functioning 1844 
 
99 Nourse, supra note 51 (citing HART & SACKS, supra note 2, at 1374-80).  
100 Gluck, States as Laboratories, supra note 47, at 1764 (citing Jody Freeman & 
Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 
51, 86-87 (2007)). 
101 Id. (citing Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 
225, 243 (1999)). 
102 Id.  
103 See EFG LEGISLATION, supra note 40, at 230 (citing United Steelworkers v. Weber, 
443 U.S. 193, 254 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)); see also WILLIAM D. POPKIN, A 
DICTIONARY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 222 (2007) (“Purposivism allows judges some 
discretion to be creative in elaborating legislative purpose while claiming, with some 
justification, that they are deferring to what the legislature might have wanted to 
accomplish.”).  
104 CARLA VIVIAN BELLO & ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT II, JERSEY JUSTICE: THREE 
HUNDRED YEARS OF THE NEW JERSEY JUDICIARY (2d ed. 1996).  
105 See Symposium, The “New Judicial Federalism” and New Jersey Constitutional 
Interpretation, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 823, 823 (1997) (“Prior to the convention in 
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Constitution “divided courts and concepts of law and equity, to the 
disadvantage of litigants, and lacked any unifying administrative 
power.”106 Seventeen state courts bereft of clearly defined jurisdictional 
boundaries led to judicial gridlock. In the absence of a unified statewide 
court system, parties did not know which court was the proper forum for 
their assorted petitions, especially since judges served on multiple 
courts and failed to adhere to any standardized procedure. The New 
Jersey judicial system was rightfully derided as “‘the most antiquated 
and intricate that exist[ed] in any considerable community of English 
speaking people.’”107 The third state constitution,108 however, marked a 
turning point for the state judiciary. The document’s “centerpiece was 
the Judicial Article, which gave the new Supreme Court unprecedented 
administrative authority, vested in the Chief Justice, to control the 
administration of all courts in New Jersey.”109 The 1947 constitution 
protected the court from overt political interference and allowed it to 
establish its own rules.110 The appointment of Arthur T. Vanderbilt, a 
past president of the American Bar Association and former dean of New 
York University Law School, as the court’s first chief justice solidified 
the transition and paved the way for a statewide judicial renaissance.111 
By the time of Vanderbilt’s death in 1957, the entire New Jersey 
judicial system — and especially the supreme court — was respected 
throughout the nation with a reputation for effective administration and 
progressive decision-making.112 Vanderbilt’s steady hand at the helm 
enabled future justices to take bold action. In his study of judicial 
behavior on six state supreme courts, Professor John Patrick Hagan 
 
1947, New Jersey’s judicial system was described as the worst in the country.”). 
106 Richard J. Hughes, Foreword to ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE NEW JERSEY 
CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE, at xv (2d ed. 1997).   
107 Alan V. Lowenstein, The Legacy of Arthur T. Vanderbilt to the New Jersey Bar, 51 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1319, 1332 (1999) (citing Richard Hartshore, Progress in New Jersey 
Judicial Administration, 3 RUTGERS L. REV. 161, 162 (1949)). 
108 New Jersey established its first state constitution in 1776. The state ratified new 
constitutions in 1844 and 1947. See Robert F. Williams, New Jersey’s State Constitutions: 
From Ridicule to Respect, N.J. LAW., June 1997, at 8, 8-9.  
109 Hughes, supra note 106, at xv.   
110 See id.  
111 See Symposium, supra note 105, at 824 ( “[W]ith the appointment of Arthur T. 
Vanderbilt as Chief Justice, the perception of the New Jersey courts changed drastically.”). 
See generally ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT II, CHANGING LAW, A BIOGRAPHY OF ARTHUR T. 
VANDERBILT (1976) (discussing the life and career of Chief Justice Vanderbilt).   
112 See G. ALAN TARR & MARY CORNELIA ALSIS PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN 
STATE AND NATION 194 (1988). 
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selected New Jersey because of its national reputation for activism and 
innovation.113 Describing the state’s highest court forty years after its 
third reincarnation, Professors Alan Tarr and Mary Porter wrote: “Since 
World War II, the New Jersey Supreme Court has assumed a role of 
leadership in the development of legal doctrine, thereby earning for 
itself a national reputation for activism and legal reformism.”114 
The New Jersey Supreme Court has been both revered and reviled 
for such a noted record of “judicial activism.”115 In a speech at Rutgers 
Law School in Newark, New Jersey, Associate Justice Virginia Long 
proudly stated that the court “has made clear to all New Jerseyans that 
our state constitution is a separate, valid, and important source of rights 
for the people of New Jersey.”116 Justice Long listed a number of the 
court’s cutting-edge constitutional decisions that addressed 
controversial social issues ranging from racial profiling117 to parental 
notification for abortion.118 Long is not the only prominent voice to 
focus on the court’s progressive constitutionalism.119 Harvard Law 
 
113 See John Patrick Hagan, Patterns of Activism on State Supreme Courts, 18 PUBLIUS 
97, 97 (1988) (“Three of the courts — California, Michigan, and New Jersey — have been 
the subjects of extensive prior analysis; they are also widely regarded as being among the 
three most active and innovative state supreme courts in the nation.” (citations omitted)).   
114 TARR & PORTER, supra note 112, at 184; see also John B. Wefing, The Performance 
of the New Jersey Supreme Court at the Opening of the Twenty-First Century: New Case, 
Same Script, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 769 (2001) [hereinafter Wefing, Performance] (“In the 
years after the Constitution of 1947 was adopted, the New Jersey Supreme Court earned a 
national reputation as an activist, progressive and generally liberal state supreme court.” 
(citations omitted)).   
115 In his 1971 study on the role of judges in four state supreme courts (Louisiana, 
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Massachusetts), Henry Glick found that New Jersey judges 
have a fairly expansive view of their role. According to Glick, “[t]he New Jersey judges 
believe courts make policy and they tend to innovate and even make proposals to the state 
legislature . . . In this way, the New Jersey Supreme Court appears to contribute frequently 
to policy change in the state.” HENRY ROBERT GLICK, SUPREME COURTS IN STATE POLITICS: 
AN INVESTIGATION OF THE JUDICIAL ROLE 47 (1971). 
116 Long, supra note 1, at 548.  
117 State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 635 (2002) (requiring police officers to have 
“reasonable suspicion” before asking a driver stopped on the highway to agree to a search). 
118 Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 165 N.J. 609 (2000) (holding the 
Parental Notification for Abortion Act, requiring a minor woman to notify her parents 
before obtaining an abortion, to be unconstitutional). 
119 See John B. Wefing, The New Jersey Supreme Court 1948-1998: Fifty Years of 
Independence and Activism, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 701, 705 [hereinafter Wefing, Fifty Years] 
(“Additionally, the court has enthusiastically embraced the New Federalism movement. As 
the United States Supreme Court has become more conservative in recent years, many state 
courts have chosen to use their state constitutions to grant greater rights than given under the 
United States Constitution. The New Jersey Supreme Court has regularly done this.” 
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Professor Duncan Kennedy once described it as the “quintessential 
liberal activist reformist court in the country,”120 and University of 
Michigan Law Professor Yale Kamisar called the New Jersey Supreme 
Court “the most innovative in the country.”121 These comments largely 
stem from the court’s well-known Abbott122 and Mount Laurel123 
decisions,124 which attempted to overhaul the state’s educational system 
and affordable housing program, respectively, through controversial 
interpretations of the state constitution.125 As a result of these high-
profile cases, a significant portion of the legal scholarship analyzing the 
New Jersey Supreme Court has focused on the justices’ “innovative”126 
constitutional decisions.127 
 
(citations omitted)).   
120 See Symposium, supra note 105, at 824 (citing Duncan Kennedy’s speech to New 
Jersey Judicial College).  
121 Bruce S. Rosen, A Bold Court Forges Ahead, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 5, 1984, at 1. 
122 Abbott v. Burke, 100 N.J. 269 (1985).  
123 S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151 (1975).  
124 See Wefing, Fifty Years, supra note 119, at 703 (“The court’s activism and 
liberalism were particularly evident in the court’s decisions dealing with school funding and 
low and moderate income housing.”).  
125 See, e.g., TARR & PORTER, supra note 112, at 233 (“Although they have rarely 
challenged the [United States Supreme] [C]ourt’s authority directly, the justices in Trenton 
have declined to defer to its judgment and have exploited the leeway available to them to 
pursue their own constitutional vision.” (emphasis added)).   
126 See JOHN B. GATES & CHARLES A. JOHNSON, THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL 
ASSESSMENT 111 (1990) (writing that New Jersey “appears on every list of innovative or 
prestigious courts”). Even Karen Foster, who argues in a 1999 article in the Albany Law 
Review that the New Jersey Supreme Court is not as independent and progressive as it is 
portrayed in the popular and scholarly literature, focuses exclusively on the Court’s 
constitutional jurisprudence. See Karen L. Foster, High Court Studies: The New Jersey 
Supreme Court in the 1990s: Independence is Only Skin Deep, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1501, 1501, 
1541 (1999) (analyzing the New Jersey Supreme Court from the Brennan perspective that 
the United States Supreme Court sets the floor, and not the ceiling, for the protection and 
advancement of individual rights — thereby allowing state high courts to use their state 
constitutions to advance individual civil rights and liberties — Foster argues that “there 
have certainly not been many shining examples of independent state constitutional 
adjudication from the New Jersey Supreme Court”). Foster adds: “While it has gone farther 
than many state high courts by consistently recognizing that the opportunity for greater 
rights exists under the state constitution, it has taken few strides to develop these rights.”  Id. 
at 1541.   
127 See, e.g., Lawrence Berger, Inclusionary Zoning Devices as Takings: The Legacy of 
the Mount Laurel Cases, 70 NEB. L. REV. 186 (1991); John M. Payne, Norman Williams, 
Exclusionary Zoning, and the Mount Laurel Doctrine: Making the Theory Fit the Facts, 20 
VT. L. REV. 665 (1996); see also Paul L. Tractenberg, Beyond Educational Adequacy: 
Looking Backward and Forward through the Lens of New Jersey, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 
411 (2008); Jeremiah Lenihan, Note, Lurking Behind the Shadow of Enduring Reform? 
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III. WHAT ABOUT THE STATUTES? — DEARTH OF STATE 
SCHOLARSHIP & RISE OF MODIFIED TEXTUALISM 
The court’s docket, however, is not only comprised of 
constitutional cases.128 Like most high court dockets in the nation, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court hears a large number of statutory cases.129 
Yet in spite of the significance and pervasiveness of statutory cases 
before the court, there has been no systematic analysis of such 
decisions. Although law students and scholars have touched upon the 
subject,130 I am not aware of any recent, scholarly attempt to dissect the 
court’s interpretive toolbox in order to discern its methodology — or 
lack thereof — for deciding statutory cases.131 The lack of scholarship in 
 
School Funding and New Jersey’s School Funding Reform Act of 2008, 34 SETON HALL 
LEGIS. J. 119 (2009). Outside of constitutional law, there has been some scholarship 
focusing on the New Jersey Supreme Court’s innovations in the realm of tort law. See, e.g., 
TARR AND PORTER, supra note 112, at 225 (discussing the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 
groundbreaking tort rulings regarding products liability); Bradley C. Canon & Lawrence 
Baum, Patterns of Adoption of Tort Law Innovations: An Application of Diffusion Theory to 
Judicial Doctrines, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV 975, 978 (1981) (ranking the New Jersey judicial 
system as the most innovative in tort law during the post-War era); Wefing, Performance, 
supra note 114, at 814-18 (covering the New Jersey Supreme Court’s liberal 
constitutionalism in the areas of tort reform, the death penalty, school funding, and criminal 
procedure). 
128 For a novel discussion of the impact statutes have on modern-day constitutionalism, 
see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 6 (2010) (“The Constitution pervasively depends upon statutes to 
fill in the huge holes in our governance structure and norms.”). 
129 See Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
74 (2000); see also ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 26, at 1 
(arguing that statutory cases are so pervasive because “[t]hroughout Western history, 
obeying the law has depended on the interpretation of statutes”). State courts are not only 
busy interpreting state statutes but most interpretation of federal statutes also takes place in 
state courts. See Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as 
“Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. (forthcoming June 2011) (manuscript at 108 
n.12) [hereinafter Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation] (citing Michael E. Solimne, 
Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty-First Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 
335, 362 (2002)), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1680020. 
130 See Note on the Norplant Case and State Court Reliance on Committee and Bill 
Reports, in EFG CASES, supra note 78, at 998 [hereinafter Note]; see also Scott Fruehwald, 
Pragmatic Textualism and the Limits of Statutory Interpretation: Dale v. Boy Scouts of 
America, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 973, 974 (2000) (criticizing the New Jersey Supreme 
Court for “exceed[ing] the limits of statutory interpretation” in the highly controversial 
decision regarding homosexuals and the Boy Scouts of America organization). Right before 
the timeframe of my dataset, the New Jersey Supreme Court handed down Dale v. Boy 
Scouts of America, which was eventually overturned by the United States Supreme Court. 
Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 160 N.J. 562 (1999), rev’d, 530 U.S. 640, 661 (2000). 
131 For a less recent analysis that focuses on the entire New Jersey judicial system’s use 
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this area is not overly surprising. Gluck notes in her recently published 
Yale Law Journal article on statutory interpretation in state courts that 
current legislation scholars are obsessively focused on the tiny fraction 
of cases in the federal court system.132 In fact, Gluck and Mercer Law 
Professor Linda Jellum133 are the only two scholars who have attempted 
any comprehensive study of modern statutory interpretation at the state 
level.134 Jellum, however, focused on legislative interpretive rules and 
their ramifications for the separation-of-powers debate.135 Gluck, on the 
other hand, analyzed cases from five state supreme courts (Oregon, 
Texas, Connecticut, Wisconsin, and Michigan) to support her thesis 
regarding the use of “Modified Textualism” in state high courts across 
the nation. Under Gluck’s “Modified Textualism,” courts first look to 
the text to divine a statute’s meaning. If the meaning is clear, the 
interpretive process ends there, without any reference to extrinsic 
sources. The justices only move to the second tier to consult the 
statute’s legislative history if they find the text ambiguous. The rigid 
analytical framework concludes with tier three, judicial canons of 
statutory construction, which the justices only resort to if the text and 
legislative history fail them.136 Gluck argues that the theory of “Modified 
 
of extrinsic aids in statutory interpretation, see Bowen, supra note 21.   
132 See Gluck, States as Laboratories, supra note 47, at 1753-55 (providing the “first 
close study of modern statutory interpretation in several state courts of last resort,” she 
writes: “The vast majority of statutory interpretation theory is based on . . . the mere two 
percent of litigation that takes place in our federal courts”).  
133 Linda D. Jellum, “Which is to be Master,” the Judiciary or the Legislature? When 
Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837, 875 (2009). For 
scholarship focusing on legislative interpretive rules, see Scott, supra note 50 (providing a 
comprehensive fifty-state survey of the codified canons of statutory interpretation). 
134 For an analysis of the use of legislative history by Wisconsin state courts, see 
Kenneth R. Dortzbach, Legislative History: The Philosophies of Justices Scalia and Breyer 
and the Use of Legislative History by the Wisconsin State Courts, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 161, 
219 (1996) (noting that the state’s courts have not repudiated the use of legislative history 
but have become more careful about referencing it in the age of Scalia). 
135 For scholarship analyzing earlier periods, see Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., State Courts and 
the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1501 (2006) (focusing on early 
American statutory interpretation in the state courts); William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About 
Words: Early Understandings of the ‘Judicial Power’ in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-
1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990 (2001) [hereinafter Eskridge, All About Words] (highlighting 
early New Jersey statutory decisions to be discussed infra). 
136 Gluck, States as Laboratories, supra note 47, at 1758 (describing Modified 
Textualism’s “strict hierarchy,” which “emphasizes textual analysis (step one); limits the 
use of legislative history (only in step two, and only if textual analysis alone does not 
suffice); and dramatically reduces reliance on the oft-used policy presumptions, the 
‘substantive canons’ of interpretation (only in step three, and only if all else fails)”). 
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Textualism” is unique in that it not only establishes a clear 
methodological order for approaching statutory cases but also elevates 
text while still allowing for the use of Scalia’s bête noir: legislative 
history.137 
Trying to weave together the statutory case law from five state 
high courts, Gluck understandably provides only one New Jersey 
Supreme Court case citation.138 The reference to Pizzullo v. New Jersey 
Manufacturers Insurance Co. is included in a long footnote, along with 
cases from a number of other jurisdictions, to support her preliminary 
view that most state high courts similarly embrace some form of 
Modified Textualism.139 Yet Gluck admits that her broader findings (in 
states other than Oregon, Texas, Connecticut, Wisconsin, and 
Michigan) are extremely premature and require verification.140 
Accepting Gluck’s challenge, I turned my focus to the New Jersey 
Supreme Court,141 which is hardly known for its rigid adherence to 
 
137 Id. at 1759. 
138 Id. at 1844 n.353 (citing Pizzullo v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 196 N.J. 251 (2008)).  
139 Id. at 1844 (“The majority of state courts may now routinely apply the basic 
modified textualist rule: first step, text only; if ambiguity is found, then second step, 
legislative history.”).   
140 See id. (“These observations are extremely tentative; close readings of cases across 
the fifty states are required to confirm them and to determine if the courts are acting 
consistently.”). 
141 Adapting Gluck’s case selection methodology to Westlaw Next, I read the entire 
population of cases located through the following search strategy: Restricting my 
“Advanced Search” to New Jersey Supreme Court cases (accessed through the “State 
Materials” tab), I entered “legislative history” into “Find documents that have – All of these 
terms” and entered the date range 01-01-2000 – 12-31-2009 into “Document Fields – Date.” 
The advanced search returned 203 cases, which I then sorted by date. In order to confirm the 
size of my dataset, I ran a similar search in LexisNexis. I restricted my search to New Jersey 
Supreme Court cases within the same date range (01-01-2000 – 12-31-2009) and then 
inserted “leg! hist!” under “terms and connectors.” The search returned 207 cases, which I 
deemed sufficiently similar in size to proceed. In regards to the selection of ten years, I was 
looking for a manageable time period that would take into account the increasing influence 
of Justice Scalia’s textualism at the federal level and the appointment of New Jersey 
Supreme Court Chief Justices by both political parties. By focusing on “legislative history,” 
I admit that my search process was somewhat flawed in that the best examples of “modified 
textualism” may not include any references to “legislative history” because the majority 
strictly relied on unambiguous text. Thus, in order to ensure a more complete dataset, I ran a 
supplemental Westlaw Next search in which I kept the same timeframe for New Jersey 
Supreme Court cases but removed “legislative history” and instead inserted “statutes” in the 
“Document Fields – Headnote.” The advanced search returned nintey cases, which I then 
sorted by date. Of the ninety cases, I read, coded, and included the forty-six that did not 
appear in my initial search, thus providing a complete dataset of 249 cases. Not surprisingly, 
many of the forty-six cases involved disputes over the application of statutes of limitations. 
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textualism.142 
In the now decade-old case Perez v. Wyeth,143 which restricted the 
application of the learned intermediary doctrine to products not directly 
marketed to consumers, Justice Pollock sharply criticized the court in 
his dissent: “The majority opinion sustains itself only by ignoring the 
plain language of an unambiguous statute, the New Jersey Products 
Liability Act, and by substituting its own policy preference for that of 
the Legislature.”144 Citing the court’s own precedent, Pollock argued for 
adherence to Modified Textualism’s first tier: “When a statute is clear, a 
court need not look beyond the statutory language to discover the 
legislative intent.”145 Yet even Justice Pollock, in the midst of his heated 
dissent, cited the “passed bill memorandum” prepared for Governor 
Kean to support his argument regarding the true legislative intent.146 
Although the fact that he was writing in dissent may have influenced his 
choice of sources,147 Justice Pollock was nonetheless unsatisfied with 
what he himself adamantly declared to be “the plain language of an 
 
See, e.g., Price v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 182 N.J. 519, 525 (upholding an equitable tolling of 
the statute of limitations related to the recovery of uninsured motorist benefits). As noted 
above, I separated out the opinions handed down under Chief Justice Zazzali, who served as 
Chief Justice for approximately one year in between the terms of Chief Justice Poritz and 
Chief Justice Rabner. In order to be thorough, I made sure to read the Zazzali Court’s 
decisions to avoid missing any potentially glaring inconsistencies in the court’s statutory 
jurisprudence. Not surprisingly, I did not find anything out of the ordinary during Zazzali’s 
short tenure. The twenty-eight Zazzali cases run from Rows 55-82 in the Appendix.  
142 See Note, supra note 130 (“New Jersey courts are among the most willing to rely on 
legislative history to construe statutes; judges in that state are willing to consider committee 
reports whether or not the statute’s text is ambiguous.” (citations omitted)).   
143 Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 161 N.J. 1, 32 (1999). The court’s approach in Perez is 
so well known that it is one of the only state supreme court decisions in the leading 
casebook on statutory interpretation. See EFG CASES, supra note 78, at 814-18.   
144 Perez, 161 N.J. at 33 (Pollock, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also id. at 42 
(“To conclude, when enacting the NJPLA, the Legislature chose to confine the expansion of 
product liability law. The majority’s preference for a different policy does not justify 
ignoring the one chosen by the Legislature.”).   
145 Id. at 35 (citing State v. Kittrell, 145 N.J. 112, 123 (1996)). 
146 Id.  
147 Justice Pollock also cited the Senate Committee statement that accompanied the bill. 
See id. at 35-36. Yet the New Jersey Product Liability Act was somewhat unique in that it 
specifically provided that “committee statements that may be adopted or included in the 
legislative history of this act shall be consulted in the interpretation and construction of this 
act.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-1a (West 2011). Given that aspect of the bill, I did not 
include Justice Pollock’s citation to the Senate committee statement as an example of a non-
textual reference and instead relied upon a non-committee statement to demonstrate his use 
of an extrinsic source. It is beyond the scope of this Article to address the role of legislative 
history in statutes that require justices to consult such sources in conjunction with the text.       
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unambiguous statute.”148 Perez, decided right before the timeframe of 
my study, reveals the court’s internal struggle between purposivism and 
textualism — both of which are carried out in the name of 
intentionalism. 
IV. THE PORITZ COURT’S EMBRACE OF THE “FUNNEL OF 
ABSTRACTION”149 
The Poritz Court,150 led by Chief Justice Deborah Poritz, was first 
and foremost committed to carrying out the legislature’s intent. In 
repeated statutory decisions, the court made clear that the most 
important “goal in interpreting statutes is to discern and to give effect to 
the underlying legislative intent.”151 Yet the court sought to “effectuate 
the legislative intent in light of the language used and the objects sought 
to be achieved.”152 Thus, the court did not generally announce a 
 
148 Perez, 161 N.J. at 33.   
149 The Poritz Court may have implicitly accepted the Eskridge/Frickey premise that 
“standing alone, textualist and archeological approaches to statutory interpretation are 
overly simplistic techniques” that lack a certain degree of legitimacy. Eskridge & Frickey, 
Practical Reasoning, supra note 75, at 383. But the Poritz Court, which rarely referred to 
general societal norms or evolving public standards in its decisions, did not go so far as to 
utilize “all the relevant factors and all [the] problem-solving skills” associated with the 
Eskridge/Frickey funnel. Id. (emphasis added). 
150 The Poritz’s Court more free-wheeling interpretive methodology, as compared to 
that utilized by the Rabner Court (discussed infra) may help explain the court’s lower 
percentage of unanimous decisions (49.7% vs. 53.7%) and higher percentage of opinions in 
which concurrences were filed (23.4% vs. 11.1%) (Separately written decisions that 
concurred in part and dissented in part were coded as if a concurrence and a dissent had 
been filed in the case). Needless to say, the Rabner Court calculations are based on a smaller 
sample size. By focusing on the last decade, moreover, I measured the end of the Poritz 
Court’s tenure and the beginning of the Rabner Court’s tenure, when the latter was more 
susceptible to the common “honeymoon” period experienced under a new chief justice. See 
Pamela Corley, Amy Steigerwalt & Artemus Ward, The Chief Justice of the United States: 
Uniter or Divider? (July 25, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/8/1/6/9/p181694_index.h
tml) (discussing the “honeymoon effect” experienced by new chief justices). Nonetheless, 
the percentages of cases in which dissents were filed were nearly identical (43.1% for the 
Poritz Court and 44.4% for the Rabner Court). Thus, there does not appear to have been 
much of a honeymoon for the Rabner Court.   
151 James v. Bd. of Trs. of Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 164 N.J. 396, 404 (2000) (citation 
omitted); see also Stryker Corp. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 168 N.J. 138, 157 (2001) (“[T]he 
paramount purpose of construing a statute [is] to ascertain the legislative intent.” (citations 
omitted)).  
152
 McCann v. Clerk of City of Jersey City, 167 N.J. 311, 320 (2001) (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted). 
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commitment to Modified Textualism.153 In the cases in which it did, 
moreover, the majority usually created a more expansive tier two that 
not only included legislative history but also general statutory 
purpose.154 In a 2004 decision dealing with New Jersey’s Consumer 
Fraud Act, the court cited its own precedent to state: “If the statute is 
clear and unambiguous on its face and admits of only one interpretation, 
we need delve no deeper than the act’s literal terms to divine the 
legislature’s intent.”155 Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Zazzali 
added: “[I]f the statute is not clear and unambiguous on its face, we 
consider sources other than the literal words of the statute to guide our 
interpretive task. The court considers extrinsic factors, such as the 
statute’s purpose, legislative history, and statutory context to ascertain 
the Legislature’s intent.”156 A broader second tier is not overly surprising 
given that the Poritz Court was ultimately less interested in text-driven 
intentionalism and more committed to a looser form of purpose-driven 
intentionalism that simply began with the text.157 In New Jersey v. 
 
153 The Poritz Court had plenty of modified textualist-driven precedents to cite, 
especially DiProspero v. Penn (discussed in Part V infra as one of the key citations for the 
Rabner Court), which was decided during its tenure. DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492-
93 (2005); see also Lozano v. Frank Deluca Constr., 178 N.J. 513, 522 (2004) 
(“Interpretation of a statute begins with ‘the plain meaning of the provision at issue.’ When 
‘the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, and susceptible to only one interpretation, 
courts should apply the statute as written without resort to extrinsic interpretative aids.’ 
However, if two interpretations of the language are plausible, a reviewing court must 
interpret the statute to effectuate the legislative intent, utilizing extrinsic evidence when it is 
helpful.” (citations omitted)). 
154 See, e.g., State v. Livingston, 172 N.J. 209, 218 (2002) (‘“As a general rule of 
statutory construction, we look first to the language of the statute. If the statute is clear and 
unambiguous on its face and admits of only one interpretation, we need delve no deeper 
than the act’s literal terms to divine the Legislature’s intent.’ If the text is susceptible to 
different interpretations, we look beyond the literal words of the statute and consider 
‘extrinsic factors, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and statutory context to 
ascertain the [L]egislature’s intent.’” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). 
155 State v. Pena, 178 N.J. 297, 307 (2004) (citing State v. Thomas, 166 N.J. 560, 567 
(2001)) (dealing with the purchase of prepaid long distance phone cards that did not provide 
the advertised savings on rates). 
156 Id. (emphasis added); see also Clymer v. Summit Bancorp., 171 N.J. 57, 66 (2002) 
(“If the text . . . is susceptible to different interpretations, the court considers extrinsic 
factors, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and statutory context to ascertain 
the legislature’s intent.” (citations omitted)). 
157 See, e.g., Lafage v. Jani, 166 N.J. 412, 431 (2001) (“When all is said and done, the 
matter of statutory construction . . . will not justly turn on literalisms . . . or the so-called 
formal rules of interpretation; it will justly turn on the breadth of the objectives of the 
legislation and the commonsense of the situation.” (citations omitted)); In re Distrib. of 
Liquid Assets upon Dissolution Reg’l High Sch. Dist. No. 1, 168 N.J. 1, 17-18 (2001) (“To 
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Bunch,158 the court had to determine whether a second-degree eluding 
statute applied to a defendant who only endangered himself during the 
chase.159 In the unanimous opinion, the majority dutifully began with the 
statute’s text and indicated the court’s obligation to end its analysis in 
the face of unambiguous text.160 The majority proceeded to determine 
that “there [was] no facial ambiguity in the eluding statute,” and 
therefore, the court “[had] no reason to resort to extrinsic aids such as 
legislative history.”161 Yet the very next sentence indicated that the 
justices did in fact look to the legislative history. How else could the 
court have known that “in this case the legislative history provided no 
meaningful assistance in resolving the question before [them]?”162 In 
State v. Crawley,163 the court declared its fidelity to legislative intent and 
began with the text, which the majority determined was ambiguous. As 
a result of the competing textual interpretations, the majority consulted 
judicial canons and legislative history, which comprise Gluck’s second 
and third tiers, respectively164 — thus creating a super-second tier. The 
 
hold otherwise would be to ignore the clear overriding purpose of the statutory framework 
in favor of ritualistic application of statutory language divorced from context.”). Whether 
she realized it or not, Chief Justice Poritz was in many ways adhering to the state courts’ 
early judicial practice of “tempering statutory words with factual, common law, and other 
contexts.” Eskridge, All About Words, supra note 135, at 1011. In his article analyzing early 
judicial practice in the states following the American Revolution, Eskridge writes that New 
Jersey judges — like their late 18th century counterparts in the other states he studied — did 
not restrict themselves to the statutory text but rather “considered statutory goals and spirits, 
the common law, natural law and common sense, and constitutional values relevant to the 
application of statutes.” Id. at 1012 (citing Ex’rs of Barracliff v. Admin. of Griscom, 1 
N.J.L. 224 (Sup. Ct. 1793); Smith v. Minor, 1 N.J.L. 16 (1790)). 
158 New Jersey v. Bunch, 180 N.J. 534 (2004).  
159 Id. at 538 (“Under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b, a person is guilty of second-degree eluding if, 
‘while operating a motor vehicle on any street or highway in this State,’ the driver 
‘knowingly flees or attempts to elude any police or law enforcement officer after having 
received any signal from such officer to bring the vehicle . . . to a full stop . . . [and] the 
flight or attempt to elude creates a risk of death or injury to any person.’ The primary issue 
in this appeal is whether the term ‘any person’ . . . includes the eluding defendant.”). 
160 Id. at 543 (“Consistent with our well-established rules of statutory construction, we 
begin with the text of the statute. If the statutory language lends itself to only one 
interpretation and that interpretation is consistent with the overall legislative scheme, we 
must ‘apply the statute as written without resort to extrinsic interpretive aids.’ Embedded in 
that canon of construction is the recognition that the terms used in a statute, if unambiguous 
in meaning, are the clearest indicators of legislative intent.” (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted)).   
161 Id. at 546 (citations omitted). 
162 Id. at 547.   
163 State v. Crawley, 187 N.J. 440, 452-53 (2006). 
164 See id. at 453 (“Because the face of the statute might suggest plausible alternative 
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court, moreover, did not feel the need to find ambiguity in one before 
moving on to the other, but rather considered both reliable extrinsic aids 
in the face of textual ambiguity. 
The Poritz Court, therefore, had actually adopted a method far 
closer to William Eskridge and Phillip Frickey’s “practical reasoning 
approach” to statutory interpretation.165 According to Eskridge and 
Frickey (and as discussed in Part I.B. supra), judges do not limit 
themselves to one piece of evidence but rather look to a number of 
reference points that together form a “Funnel of Abstraction.”166 The 
hierarchical funnel begins with more concrete sources and then becomes 
increasingly abstract as it proceeds from the specific “rule of law” 
category to the more general grouping of “democratic values,” and 
finally, to the even more malleable “justice norms.” Like Gluck’s 
model, the method of interpretation begins with text and includes 
legislative history,167 but the modality differs in that it does not contain 
strict tiers.168 Instead of stopping at any one point — as Gluck adherents 
will, at step one in the case of unambiguous statutory text or at step two 
in the case of ambiguous statutory text but unambiguous legislative 
history — “the interpreter will move up and down the diagram, 
evaluating and comparing the different considerations represented by 
 
interpretations, we next look at related statutes and legislative history to shed light on the 
contested language” (citing 2B Norman J. Singer, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
§ 51.03 (5th ed. 1992) (“Statutes are considered to be in pari materia when they relate to the 
same person or thing, to the same class of persons or things, or have the same purpose or 
object.”) (footnote omitted))).  
165 Eskridge & Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 75, at 351.   
166 Id. at 353. 
167 The funnel is formally comprised of the following levels (from “most concrete” to 
“most abstract”): Statutory Text; Whole Act and Integration into Structure of Law; 
Imaginative Reconstruction and Legislative History; Legislative Purpose; Evolution of 
Statute; Current Values. Eskridge & Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 75, at 353-62. 
However, I took a more expansive view of the funnel and coded for additional external 
factors, as long as they fell under the three broad categories of “textual, historical, and 
evolutive” considerations. Needless to say, I did not re-code for the Gluck tiers but rather 
only included additional factors consulted according to the funnel. 
168 Although text forms the concrete foundation of the funnel, it is still more paramount 
in Gluck’s model in which it is the sole component of Modified Textualism’s first tier. The 
Poritz Court often began with the text but also lumped it together with other funnel 
components when interpreting statutes. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Land, 186 N.J. 
163, 168 (2006) (looking to the Insurance Fraud Protection Act’s “plain language, statutory 
purpose, and penalties to determine whether the Legislature addressed the question. Finally, 
we examine prior case law addressing the issue.”).   
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each source of argumentation.”169 This does not mean that the judges 
will necessarily apply every funnel component, but rather that they will 
weigh the relative value of each in the individual cases before them and 
then consult where applicable. The majority’s “funnel” in State v. Pena 
may not have been an exact replica of the Eskridge/Frickey model, but 
it similarly moved beyond the text to include statutory purpose, 
legislative history, and statutory context — the latter of which often 
includes structure and precedent.170 In Miah v. Ahmed,171 a unanimous 
Poritz Court determined that a displaced tenant was entitled to 
relocation assistance, calculated at six times his regular rent based on 
the “unambiguous statutory language.”172 Far from stopping at the text, 
however, the court also considered the statute’s “public-policy 
objectives.”173 The purpose-driven inquiry included an examination of 
the statute’s evolution in the legislature,174 use of the judicial canon 
“noscitur a sociis,”175 references to legislative history,176 deference to 
state agency interpretations,177 and consideration of “the remedial goals 
of the section’s statutory scheme.”178 Although the court did not 
necessarily “slide up and down the funnel,”179 it also did not limit itself 
to Gluck’s rigid regime. In Mani v. Mani,180 an alimony case, the 
 
169 Eskridge & Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 75, at 353.   
170 See State v. Pena, 178 N.J. 297, 308 (2004).  
171 Miah v. Ahmed, 179 N.J. 511, 515 (2004). 
172 Id.  
173 Id.  
174 Id. at 518. “Evolution” is one of the funnel’s more abstract components. See 
Eskridge & Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 75, at 358. 
175 Miah, 179 N.J. at 521 (“[T]he meaning of words [used in a statute] may be indicated 
and controlled by those [words] with which they are associated.” (citing Germann v. 
Matriss, 55 N.J. 193, 220 (1970))). 
176 Id. at 523 (citing Assemb. 2267, 1993 Sess., 205th Leg., at 1 (N.J. 1993)). 
177 Id. at 524 (noting that the Department of Community Affairs’ “interpretation of 
section h provides even further support for [the court’s] conclusion” and referencing the 
Agency’s May 1995 memorandum to its relocation officers). The unanimous court 
explained: “Although we are not bound by an agency’s interpretation of a statute, we 
generally accord it substantial deference when the Legislature has entrusted the agency with 
the statute’s enforcement.”  Id. (citation omitted).     
178 Id. at 523. 
179 ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 26, at 56 (“The 
interpreter does not view the statutory text in isolation, but reads it in connection with the 
legislative history, statutory practice and precedents, and current norms and values.”).   
180 Mani v. Mani, 183 N.J. 70, 72 (2005) (reversing the holding of the intermediate 
appellate court, the court found that marital fault should not be taken into consideration 
when calculating alimony under § 2A:34-23(b) unless the fault had an adverse effect on the 
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majority similarly engaged in a fairly eclectic analysis that examined 
“the purposes underlying alimony, the words of the alimony statute, 
[and] the legislative history behind the act . . . .”181 The decision, 
particularly the discussion of certain forms of “outrageous” conduct that 
“violate the social contract,” represented the funnel’s most abstract 
“norms” component.182 Yet the most notable aspect of the decision was 
that the opinion began with a discussion of the history of alimony 
dating back to “early England.”183 
In some instances, although few and far between, the court began 
with the text but then disregarded the literal reading in the name of 
carrying out the statute’s spirit or purpose.184 In Perez v. Rent-A-Center, 
Inc.,185 for example, the court examined the rent-to-own industry in 
which consumers can rent household appliances and other retail goods 
with the option to purchase them at the end of their lease. In order to 
determine the validity of the contracts under the Retail Installment Sales 
Act (hereinafter “RISA”), the court began with the statutory text.186 Yet 
once the court determined that the contracts were “not a perfect fit with 
the words of the statute,” and therefore, not subject to regulation under 
RISA, it cited a 1957 decision by former Chief Justice Joseph 
Weintraub in which he declared: “[C]ases inevitably arise in which a 
literal application of the language used would lead to results 
incompatible with the legislative design.”187 The court proceeded to cite 
 
finances of either party or was especially egregious). 
181 Id. at 92-93.   
182 Id. at 92 (noting that certain examples, such as “[d]eliberately infecting a spouse 
with a loathsome disease,” embody “the concept that some conduct, by its very nature is so 
outrageous that it can be said to violate the social contract, such that society would not abide 
continuing the economic bonds between the parties”). 
183 Id. at 78. 
184 See, e.g., DeLisa v. Cnty. of Bergen, 165 N.J. 140, 147 (2000) (ruling in favor of the 
employee in a Conscientious Employee Protection Act case, the court explained, “A settled 
principle is that ‘statutes are to be read sensibly rather than literally and the controlling 
legislative intent is to be presumed as ‘consonant to reason and good direction’”‘ (citations 
omitted)). The court also justified its non-textual decision via the doctrine against absurd 
results. Id. Instead of relying on the text, the court employed a funnel approach, relying on 
“statutory purpose, CEPA’s legislative history and precedents from other jurisdictions.” Id. 
at 146.   
185 Perez v. Rent-A-Ctr., Inc., 186 N.J. 188, 193 (2006). 
186 Id. at 205 (“At issue is whether Perez’s transaction with Rent-A-Center constitutes a 
retail installment sales contract. RISA defines a “retail installment contract” as follows . . ..” 
(citations omitted)).  
187 Id. at 208 (citing New Capitol Bar & Grill Corp. v. Div. of Emp’t Sec., 25 N.J. 155, 
160 (1957) (“It is frequently difficult for a draftsman of legislation to anticipate all 
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RISA’s overall legislative purpose of protecting the public in order to 
hold that the contracts in question were covered, thereby reinstating 
Perez’s claims under the statute.188 Yet even in this decision, the court 
did not restrict itself to text and purpose but also utilized judicial canons 
of construction189 and referenced other funnel factors, such as legislative 
history,190 to address Rent-A-Center’s arguments.191 
 Critics of the Poritz court’s funnel-driven approach may argue that 
it is not an approach at all but rather a free-wheeling methodology 
bereft of logical consistencies. Some of the justices on the court 
advocated for greater fidelity to the literal text. In his Trinity Cemetery 
Association, Inc. v. Township of Wall concurrence, Justice Verniero 
agreed with the majority’s two holdings but took issue with his 
colleagues’ reliance on legislative history in reaching them.192 Justice 
Verniero did not dispute that the legislative history supported the 
majority’s conclusion; he just felt that “one need look no further than 
the plain language of the Act to reach that result.”193 Arguing for the 
literal enforcement of the statute’s terms, Verniero even took a passing 
shot at the majority by citing United States Supreme Court Justice Felix 
 
situations and to measure his words against them.”)). The court, citing its own precedent, 
added: “It is not the meaning of isolated words, but the internal sense of the law, the spirit of 
the correlated symbols of expression, that we seek in the exposition of a statute.” Id. at 209 
(citing Caputo v. Best Foods, Inc., 17 N.J. 259 (1955)). 
188 Id. at 209 (“In enacting RISA, the stated legislative purpose was protection of the 
public interest through the regulation of the charges associated with the time sale of 
goods.”).   
189 See id. at 209 (construing remedial statutes liberally); id. at 211 (“[W]hen the 
Legislature utilizes words that have previously been the subject of judicial construction, it is 
deemed to have used those words in the sense that has been ascribed to them.” (citations 
omitted)).   
190 See id. at 215 (citing Governor Brendan Byrne, Statement in Signing S. 3005 and S. 
3101 (Mar. 31, 1981)). The court explained, “[I]t is well-established that the governor’s 
action in approving or vetoing a bill constitutes a part of the legislative process, and the 
action of the governor upon a bill may be considered in determining legislative intent.” Id. 
(citations omitted).     
191 The court put heavy emphasis on the fact that Senate bill 3005, which removed 
interest rate caps in RISA, was passed during the same legislative window, by the same 
sponsors, as Senate bill 3101, which amended the criminal usury statute to create a new 
interest rate cap ceiling that trumped the language of S. 3005. In addition to the court’s 
textual argument regarding the explicit interaction of the two statutes, it also noted “that 
statutes that are adopted on the same day should be read in pari materia . . . ..” Perez, 186 
N.J. at 214 (citations omitted).    
192 Trinity Cemetery Ass’n, Inc. v. Wall, 170 N.J. 39, 44-47 (2001). 
193 Id. at 49 (citing State v. Butler, 89 N.J. 220, 226 (1982) to support his point that 
“legislative history need not be considered when [the] statute is ambiguous on its face”).   
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Frankfurter: ‘“Construction, no doubt, is not a mechanical process . . . 
But there is a difference between reading what is and rewriting it.”‘194 In 
Marshall v. Klebanov, Justice Rivera-Soto offered a stinging dissent in 
which he chastised the majority for disregarding the unambiguous, plain 
language of the statute.195 In an emotionally charged case involving a 
suicide and claims of psychiatric malpractice, the majority made no 
attempt to hide its preference for the statute’s spirit over the text;196 
Justice Rivera-Soto, who opened his dissent with the statutory text, 
refused to go along with his peers.197 
Yet the Poritz Court’s adoption of the Eskridge/Frickey Funnel of 
Abstraction is in accord with Todd Rakoff’s essay in the Northwestern 
University Law Review in which the Harvard Law Professor attacks 
restrictive monolithic approaches to statutory interpretation.198 Rakoff is 
primarily concerned with the rise of methodological stare decisis, a 
theory advanced by Gluck,199 arguing that such restrictive and 
 
194 Id. (citing Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting)).   
195 Marshall v. Klebanov, 188 N.J. 23, 42 (2006). 
196 Id. at 37 (“[W]ords may be expanded or limited according to the manifest reason and 
obvious purpose of the law. The spirit of the legislative direction prevails over the literal 
sense of the terms.” (citations omitted)).   
197 Id. at 42 (“The application of the legislative construct to this case is simple and 
direct. Because the majority agrees that defendant did not incur a duty to ‘warn and protect,’ 
the mandated conclusion is self-evident from the plain language of the statute . . . .”). 
198 See Todd D. Rakoff, Statutory Interpretation as a Multifarious Enterprise, 104 NW. 
U. L. REV 1559, 1560 (2010). 
199 For the purposes of this paper, I do not address the issue of methodological stare 
decisis, which is a major component of Abbe Gluck’s work on statutory interpretation at the 
state level. She notes that “[i]n the watershed case, Portland General Electric Co. v. Bureau 
of Labor and Industries, [859 P.2d 1143 (Or. 1993)], the [Oregon Supreme] [C]ourt 
unanimously announced a three-step methodology to control all future statutory 
interpretation questions.” Gluck, States as Laboratories, supra note 47, at 1775. Although 
the court later appeared to reverse course in Gaines v. State, 169 P.3d 1268 (Or. 2007), the 
“sixteen-year period” represented a bold step in the field of statutory interpretation. See 
Gluck, States as Laboratories, supra note 47, at 1776. Similar to the United States Supreme 
Court, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court has never attempted to bind itself 
methodologically. Although my dataset reveals a heavy reliance on case law precedent (to 
the point where I stopped coding for it because it was so ubiquitous), I did not see any 
attempt by the court to institute a system of methodological stare decisis for statutory cases. 
From a normative standpoint, I am also torn between the benefits of methodological stare 
decisis outlined by Gluck and the drawbacks of such an approach outlined by Leib and 
Serota. Compare Gluck, States as Laboratories, supra note 47, at 1798 (noting the rule-of-
law benefits, including predictability and consistency for all involved actors, offered by 
methodological stare decisis), with Leib & Serota, supra note 69, at 48 (arguing that “there 
are distinctive, underappreciated benefits that result from methodological diversity and 
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unpredictable approaches stifle the interpretive process. 200 But Rakoff’s 
emphasis on the existence of many different kinds of statutes is not as 
relevant as his normative description of “[s]tatutory interpretation [as] 
more open-ended, more dependent on wisdom — and . . . more 
interesting — than the search for a comprehensive but monistic theory 
allows.”201 The Poritz Court’s funnel bridges the gap between Rakoff’s 
two poles, combining a wide range of sources capable of offering 
wisdom to the interpreters with an overarching structure. Poritz would 
agree with Rakoff that judges should and “are pursuing their craft by 
choosing the right tool for the varying tasks at hand.”202 That broad 
range of tools can be located in the funnel, which offers choice within a 
restricted framework. The funnel, and by extension the Poritz Court’s 
methodological approach, may not neatly fit with one form of 
textualism or another, but that does not mean it lacks methodological 
ordering. The funnel itself, like Modified Textualism, is simply another 
interpretive option for judges. 
V. THE RABNER COURT’S EMBRACE OF “MODIFIED 
TEXTUALISM-LITE” 
Abbe Gluck read Pizzullo (her one New Jersey case citation) 
correctly: in a unanimous decision, Justice Hoens explained that the 
court looks “first to the plain language of the statute, seeking further 
guidance only to the extent that the Legislature’s intent cannot be 
derived from the words that it has chosen.”203 But when “the language is 
not clear and unambiguous on its face, [the justices] look to other 
interpretive aids to assist [them] in [their] understanding of the 
 
make our current regime of dissensus a more desirable approach.”). For a forceful defense 
of the normative benefits of stare decisis in the realm of statutory interpretation, see Sydney 
Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation Methodology?, 
96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1863 (2008) (arguing “not only that courts should give doctrines of 
statutory interpretation methodology stare decisis effect, but also that courts should give 
even stronger stare decisis effect to doctrines of statutory interpretation than they give to 
doctrines of substantive law”).    
200 Rakoff, supra note 198, at 1560 (arguing that “there are many legitimate and useful 
modes of statutory interpretation” and that “no theory that would justify its being the 
‘consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation’”).    
201 Id. at 1586. 
202 Id. at 1560.  
203 Pizzullo v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 196 N.J. 251, 264 (2008) (citing Roberts v. State 
Police, 191 N.J. 516, 521 (2007)). 
YOFFIE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2011  7:35 PM 
336 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL Vol. 35:2 
Legislature’s will.”204 Deeming the term “election” to be ambiguous, 
Hoens proceeded to quote from the Senate Sponsor’s Statement and 
from the Commerce Committee’s Statement to help craft her opinion.205 
Thus, the justice’s decision represents the very embodiment of Gluck’s 
“Modified Textualism,” at least in terms of the first two rigid tiers. 
Gluck’s footnote, however, does not mention that intentionalism,206 
bordering on purposivism, drove the decision. Hoens stated that the 
justices’ statutory “analysis requires that [they] first consider the 
meaning and intent of [the] Legislature in enacting the statute that is at 
the heart of the dispute.”207 In a case pitting a greedy insurance company 
against a married couple severely injured in a car accident, the court had 
no problem engaging in a tortured analysis of the allegedly ambiguous 
term. Hoens also cited the “fundamental principles” of insurance policy 
analysis, including the court’s “role in ensuring their conformity to 
public policy and principles of fairness.”208 
Nonetheless, the court still felt the need to declare that the statute 
was ambiguous before looking to the statute’s legislative history. And 
Pizzullo, decided under Chief Justice Rabner, 209 was not an anomaly but 
 
204 Id. (citations omitted).  
205 Id. at 266-67 (citing Sponsor’s Statement to Senate Bill No. 804, 1992 Sess., 205th 
Leg. (N.J. 1992); Senate Commerce Committee Statement to Senate Bill No. 804, 1992 
Sess., 205th Leg. (N.J. 1992)). Like Brudney and Ditslear, I do not attempt to differentiate 
between the various forms of legislative history. In keeping with the Brudney/Ditslear 
method, “so long as legislative history [was] expressly identified and discussed by the 
majority as either an affirmatively probative or a determining factor, [I] conclude[d] that it 
was relied upon by the Court.” Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 27, at 128 (citations 
omitted). This also implies that an isolated reference in the majority opinion to the phrase 
“legislative history” did not serve as proof that the justices moved beyond Gluck’s text-only 
tier one. For the sake of clarity, I created a scale from 0-3 (0: no factor; 1: contributing 
factor; 2: partial reliance; 3: decisive factor) that measured the extent to which the court 
relied on legislative history in rendering its decision. In a few instances, I included an N/A 
ranking, which usually indicated an out-of-context reference to the phrase “legislative 
history” that came up in my search but was in no way related to the court’s decision. See 
Appendix. For an overview of the different forms of legislative history most commonly used 
by both the Rabner and Poritz Courts and the frequency with which they were referenced in 
majority opinions, see the two charts included at the beginning of the Appendix. 
206 Like the Poritz Court, the Rabner Court is committed, first and foremost, to carrying 
out the legislature’s intent. See, e.g., Lee v. First Union Nat. Bank, 199 N.J. 251, 259 (2009) 
(“The goal when interpreting a statute is to determine and effectuate the Legislature’s 
intent.” (citing D’Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 192 N.J. 110, 119 (2007))). 
207 Pizzullo, 196 N.J. at 263. 
208 Id. at 270 (citing Gibson v. Callaghan, 158 N.J. 662, 669-70 (1999)). 
209 Stuart Rabner was nominated as  Chief Justice in 2007. See Jennifer Moroz & Elisa 
Ung, Corzine Taps Rabner for Top Court Position, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 5, 2007, 
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rather symbolic of the Rabner Court’s preferred methodological 
approach to statutory interpretation: “Modified Textualism-lite.”210 
Unlike the Poritz Court’s more purpose-driven approach, the Rabner 
Court211 repeatedly declares its fidelity to modified textualism, primarily 
through its citations212 to DiProspero v. Penn: 
A court should not ‘resort to extrinsic interpretative aids’ when ‘the 
statutory language is clear and unambiguous, and susceptible to only 
one interpretation . . . .On the other hand, if there is ambiguity in the 
statutory language that leads to more than one plausible 
interpretation, we may to turn to extrinsic evidence, ‘including 
legislative history, committee reports, and contemporaneous 
construction.’213 
In State v. Baker,214 the court outlined its commitment through a 
reference to the section of Daiddone v. Buterick Bulkheading that cites 
the above language from DiProspero.215 Beginning with the text, the 
Baker court also stopped with the text, finding the plain language of the 
statute under consideration (Interstate Agreement on Detainers, N.J.S.A. 
 
http://www.philly.com/inquirer/home_top_stories/20070605_Corzine_taps_Rabner_for_top
_court_position.html.     
210 Although a bit of a cross between Gluck’s “Modified Textualism” and 
Eskridge/Frickey’s “Funnel of Abstraction,” Fruehwald’s “Pragmatic Textualism” is also 
applicable to the Rabner Court for the theory’s recognition of the text as supreme but 
willingness to look to extrinsic sources in the event that the text lacks clarity. See 
Fruehwald, supra note 130, at 997-1013. 
211 In Hardy ex rel. Dowdell v. Abdul-Matin, the dissent acknowledged that “the PIP 
statute does not explicitly require knowledge of lack of permission,” but then criticized the 
Rabner Court majority for ruling against the injured high school student based on the 
statute’s literal interpretation. Hardy ex rel. Dowdell v. Abdul-Matin, 198 N.J. 95, 106 
(2009) (Long, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, which was concerned with “social 
necessity,” the majority’s literal reading was “‘inconsistent with the overall purpose’ of the 
Act.” Id. (citations omitted). Yet on occasion, even the Rabner Court majority falls victim to 
the sympathetic facts of the case and disregards the clear statutory text for a higher purpose. 
See, e.g., Maglies v. Estate of Guy, 193 N.J. 108, 126 (2007) (rejecting the plain language of 
the Anti-Eviction Act in order to uphold “the spirit of the law” and protect the impoverished 
tenant who lost her mother). The dissent specifically criticized the majority for “fail[ing] to 
adhere to and apply the plain language of the Act . . . .” Id. at 128 (Hoens, J., dissenting). 
212 See, e.g., Patel v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm’n, 200 N.J. 413, 419 (2009); In re 
Attorney Gens. Directive on Exit Polling: Media & Non-Partisan Pub. Interest Grps., 200 
N.J. 283, 297 (2009); Burnett v. Cnty. of Bergen, 198 N.J. 408, 421 (2009); Mason v. City 
of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 68 (2008); State v. Froland, 193 N.J. 186, 194 (2007). 
213 DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492-93 (2005) (citations omitted). 
214 State v. Baker, 198 N.J. 189, 193 (2009). 
215 See id. at 193 (citing Daidone v. Buterick Bulkheading, 191 N.J. 557, 565-66 (2007) 
(citing DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492)).    
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2A:159A-1 to -15) to be unambiguous.216 In Klumb v. Board of 
Education, the court similarly followed the methodology it announced 
in Pizzulo by citing to DiProspero217 and only moving beyond the text 
after first finding ambiguity.218Yet I refer to the court’s interpretive 
methodology as “Modified Textualism-lite” because it conveniently 
ignores DiProspero when it is not inclined to limit itself to the text.219 In 
some instances, the court will even cite DiProspero or Pizzullo and yet 
not strictly adhere to the modified textualist regime outlined in those 
cases. 
220
 For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court had to decide 
whether indicted State Senator Wayne R. Bryant could use funds from 
 
216 Id. at 193 (rejecting the defendant’s argument because it called for a construction of 
the statute that was “inconsistent with the plain language” of the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers).   
217 Klumb v. Bd. of Educ. of Manalapan-Englishtown Reg’l High Sch. Dist., 199 N.J. 
14, 23-24 (2009) (“To discern the Legislature’s intent, courts first turn to the plain language 
of the statute in question.” (citing DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492)). The court added: “‘If the 
plain language leads to a clear and unambiguous result, then [the] interpretive process is 
over.’ Where the plain meaning does not point the court to a ‘clear and unambiguous result,’ 
it then considers extrinsic evidence from which it hopes to glean the Legislature’s intent.” 
Id. at 24 (citations omitted).    
218 Klumb, 199 N.J. at 26 (“We view the language as ambiguous and therefore look 
outside it for clues to its meaning.”). 
219 William Eskridge has commented that the Rabner Court’s lack of strict fidelity to 
DiProspero, coupled with its broader list of extrinsic sources for tier two, appears to him to 
be more indicative of a textually-anchored funnel as opposed to a “Modified Textualism-
lite” system of statutory interpretation. See E-mail from William N. Eskridge, Jr., John A. 
Garver Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School, to Author (May 30, 2010, 15:14 EST) 
(on file with author). Although there is little practical difference between the two theories, 
semantics matter, and I have chosen the latter based on the Rabner Court’s willingness to 
restrict itself to Modified Textualism’s tier one, and therefore, not consult any sources 
beyond the text. The funnel, even a textually-anchored one, on the other hand, is predicated 
on the notion that judges will at least consider extrinsic sources in the face of unambiguous 
text, even if they do not reference them. Yet I concede that the Rabner Court generally 
muddles tiers two and three, combining Gluck’s tier two legislative history with extrinsic 
sources other than Gluck’s tier three judicial canons of construction. Compare State v. Ortiz, 
193 N.J. 278, 288 (2008) (noting that in the face of textual ambiguity, the court should 
“resort to extrinsic interpretive aids, such as legislative history, canons of construction, or 
the policy considerations behind the legislation” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)), with 
In re Liquidation of Integrity Ins. Co., 193 N.J. 86, 94 (2007) (noting that in the face of 
textual ambiguity, the court should “turn to extrinsic evidence, including legislative history, 
committee reports, and contemporaneous construction” (emphasis added)). The Rabner 
Court also generally refrains from demanding ambiguity at tier two, regardless of which 
extrinsic source(s) it includes, before moving on to tier three.            
220 See, e.g., Jen Elec., Inc. v. Cnty. of Essex, 197 N.J. 627, 643 (2009) (declaring the 
text’s plain meaning to be “self-evident” and yet then referencing legislative history to 
bolster its point).  
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his candidate committee to cover his legal defense bills. 221 Tasked with 
interpreting the state’s Campaign Contributions Act, the court cited 
DiProspero and began with the statute’s text. Following an exhaustive 
review of the statute’s language, which included citations to two 
dictionaries,222 the majority determined that the language was clear and 
unambiguous. Yet the majority did not stop with the text: in addition to 
affording Chevron deference to the Election Law Enforcement 
Commission’s regulations,223 the court also proceeded to review the 
relevant legislative history “[f]or the sake of completeness.”224 In State  
v. Smith,225 moreover, the court similarly determined that the statute’s 
language clearly indicated that there was no requisite mens rea; proving 
possession of the defaced weapon, therefore, was sufficient for a guilty 
verdict.226 Nonetheless, the court once again resorted to extrinsic sources 
“for purposes of thoroughness.”227 This was a repeated pattern in which 
the court seemed torn between Gluck’s Modified Textualism and 
Eskridge/Frickey’s Funnel of Abstraction. The court was focused on the 
statutory text’s ambiguity, or lack thereof, but could not quite help itself 
from seeking additional confirmation. In Zabilowicz v. Kelsey, the final 
case in the dataset, the court was interpreting the “Deemer Statute” 
regarding its application to a New Jersey car accident involving two 
out-of-state drivers.228 The dispute revolved around the provision of 
 
221 See In re Election Law Enforcement Comm’n Advisory Op., 201 N.J. 254, 256 
(2010). Although the Rabner Court heard this case on November 9, 2009, it did not hand 
down a decision until March 8, 2010, and thus the case fell just outside of my dataset. 
Therefore, the case is not coded in the Appendix.        
222 There is some dispute as to whether dictionary citations constitute tier one or tier 
three, but given their usefulness for textual analysis, I generally considered them to be part 
of the first tier. Yet I listed the different dictionaries cited in the Eskridge/Frickey funnel 
column of the Appendix.     
223
“The regulations, singly and collectively, do not advance Bryant’s position that he 
may use campaign funds to finance his criminal defense.” In re Election Law Enforcement 
Comm’n Advisory Op., 201 N.J. at 265.  
224 Id. at 266. 
225 State v. Smith, 197 N.J. 325, 338 (2009). 
226 Id. at 329. 
227 Id. at 333 (“And, ordinarily, when a statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, we 
‘need delve no deeper than the act’s literal terms’. . . That said, we shall assume for 
purposes of thoroughness that the language of the statute contains some ambiguity and, 
therefore, in such circumstances it is permissible to turn to extrinsic evidence for aid in 
interpreting this statute.” (citations omitted)). 
228 Zabilowicz, v. Kelsey, 200 N.J. 507, 510 (2009) (“N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.4 — known as 
the ‘Deemer Statute’ — provides benefits and burdens to out-of-state drivers insured by 
companies authorized to do business in New Jersey.” (citations omitted)). 
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“personal injury protection benefits” under the state’s “no-fault” 
insurance system. Yet before the court even introduced the background 
facts of the case, the majority reversed the Appellate Division’s holding 
based on the statute’s “plain language.”229 Nonetheless, after an 
extensive review of the relevant facts and statutory text, the majority 
concluded by noting that “[n]othing in the legislative history . . . 
conflict[ed] with [its] plain reading.”230 
Additional support for the Rabner Court’s more restrained 
interpretive methodology (as compared to that of the Poritz Court) — 
including its greater commitment to legislative intent — is evident in its 
higher percentage of citations to the New Jersey legislature’s codified 
canons of statutory interpretation.231 One of the two codified canons is a 
glossary of legal terms that includes definitions for words such as 
“affirmation” and “assessor” and is generally only relevant when one of 
the specific terms is included in a statute.232 New Jersey Statute, Section 
1:1-1, however, which the court cites in Bryant,233 provides a more 
general framework for conducting statutory interpretation: 
In the construction of the laws and statutes of this state, both civil 
and criminal, words and phrases shall be read and construed with 
their context, and shall, unless inconsistent with the manifest intent 
of the legislature or unless another or different meaning is expressly 
indicated, be given their generally accepted meaning, according to 
the approved usage of the language.234 
Hardly domineering, the statute can be read to provide the justices 
with some breathing room based on its use of the phrase “generally 
accepted meaning” and the always-malleable notion of “context.” But 
 
229 Id. at 511 (“We now reverse. Plaintiff is subject to all of the provisions of N.J.S.A. 
39:6A-8(a) pursuant to the Deemer Statute. Under the plain language of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-
8(a), the limitation-on-lawsuit threshold can be invoked only by a defendant who is eligible 
to receive New Jersey PIP benefits.”).  
230 Id. at 518 (emphasis added) (referencing the Deemer Statute and the related N.J.S.A. 
39:6A-8(a)).   
231 See generally Scott, supra note 50 (providing the first comprehensive fifty-state 
survey of legislatively enacted rules of interpretation). Gluck explains that some of these 
laws, such as Connecticut’s “text-focused regime” even stem from “what the legislature 
perceived as an inappropriate judicial power grab over interpretive methodology.” See 
Gluck, States as Laboratories, supra note 47, at 1756. There is no indication, however, that 
the New Jersey legislature passed these laws as a result of controversial state supreme court 
decisions. 
232 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 1:1-2 (West 2011). 
233 See In re Election Law Enforcement Comm’n Advisory Op., 201 N.J. at 263.  
234 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 1:1-1 (West 2011). 
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the underlying message comes across clearly: the legislature is in 
charge, and therefore, the court should not get creative with the text. 
Unlike the Poritz Court, which only cited the two codified canons in 2.4 
percent of its sample cases, the Rabner Court cited them in 22.2 percent 
of its sample cases.235 
VI. LOOKING BACKWARDS AND MOVING FORWARDS 
A. Institutional Explanations 
In his influential article on the New Jersey Supreme Court, Seton 
Hall Law Professor John B. Wefing outlines twelve institutional factors 
that have “given the court a willingness and ability to take activist, and 
independent stands” in its decisions.236 Wefing is primarily interested in 
exploring the court’s independence vis-à-vis the United States Supreme 
Court and other state high courts across the nation and does not 
specifically address the issue of statutory interpretation. Yet the decline 
of two interrelated factors on his list appears to shed light on the court’s 
evolving statutory jurisprudence over the past decade: “political support 
for the judiciary” and the “moderate position of the Governors of both 
parties during the last fifty years.”237 Christine Todd Whitman, a 
 
235 See Appendix. The Rabner Court includes Rows 1-54, inclusive, for a total of fifty-
four cases, and the Poritz Court includes Rows 83-249, inclusive, for a total of 167 cases. 
The Rabner Court percentage includes citations in three dissents. The Poritz Court dissents 
did not include any citations to either codified canon. The disparity in citations cannot be 
attributed to the relative newness of the statute. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 1:1-1 was included 
verbatim in the 1937 codification of New Jersey Statutes. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 1:1-1 (West 
1937).   
236 See Wefing, Fifty Years, supra note 119, at 710. 
237 Id. (citations omitted). The rest of the list includes:  
[T]he method of appointment of the justices; the unwritten but institutionalized 
requirement that the court be balanced between the political parties; the absence 
of initiative and referendum; the relative difficulty of constitutional amendment; 
the absence of an elected attorney general and elected prosecutors; the limited 
docket of the supreme court; the absence for a long time of the death penalty; 
the leadership and political clout of the chief justices; the competence, 
confidence and long tenure of the justices; and the presence of a public 
advocate. 
 Id. (citations omitted). Although there is no reason to believe that the following systemic 
change has impacted the court, it is worth noting that the voters of New Jersey recently 
amended its Constitution (2005) and elected the state’s first lieutenant governor (2009). See 
N.J. CONST. art. 5, § 1. Like her boss, Lieutenant Governor Kim Guadagno has a strong 
prosecutorial background. She has served as a federal prosecutor, assistant attorney general 
and deputy director of the Division of Criminal Justice, and sheriff of Monmouth County. 
See Lt. Governor Kim Guadagno: Biography, ST. OF N.J.,  
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moderate Republican governor who was always viewed as a centrist 
within the Republican Party, appointed Chief Justice Poritz.238 Poritz 
was also re-nominated by James McGreevey, a Democratic Governor 
who styled himself as a “New Democrat” in the vein of President Bill 
Clinton. McGreevey’s decision to re-nominate the Republican Poritz 
also ensured popular and centrist support within the political community 
for the Poritz-led judiciary.239 
The same cannot be said for the rise of Chief Justice Rabner. As 
noted above, the Rabner Court has been more attentive to text and 
legislative intent and less devoted to the more abstract theory of 
purposivism. The Rabner Court’s more systematic approach to 
interpreting statutes may stem from the circumstances under which 
then-State Attorney General Stuart Rabner became chief justice. All 
parties involved expected the Rabner nomination and confirmation 
process to proceed smoothly,240 but the New Jersey State Senate had 
other plans. Many African-American senators were furious that the 
Governor did not give more serious consideration to minority 
 
http://www.state.nj.us/governor/lt/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2011); see also Teja Anderson, Kim 
Guadagno-New Jersey’s First Lieutenant Governor, LIVING MEDIA (Monmouth Cnty., N.J.),  
Apr. 26, 2010, http://www.livinginmedia.com/article/kim_guadagno_new_jerseys 
_first_lieutenant_governor.html. Upon taking office, Governor Christie also eliminated the 
office of the public advocate. See New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate, ST. OF 
N.J., http://www.state.nj.us/publicadvocate/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2011) (“On June 29, 2010, 
Governor Chris Christie signed P.L. 2010, Chapter 34, which officially abolished the 
Department of the Public Advocate and transferred certain functions, powers and duties to 
other state Departments.”).     
238 See Christine Todd Whitman, Op-Ed., It’s Still My Party, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 
2009, at A27 (describing her disappointment over Senator Arlen Specter’s decision to 
switch from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party and her belief that his decision is 
an indication of the dwindling prospects for moderates within the Republican Party). See 
generally CHRISTINE TODD WHITMAN, IT’S MY PARTY TOO: THE BATTLE FOR THE HEART OF 
THE GOP AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA (2005) (descrying the rightward shift of the 
Republican Party and decline in stature of moderate Republican national leaders, such as 
Colin Powell, George Pataki, and herself).  
239 See David Kocieniewski, Aides Say McGreevey Will Seek Another Term for Chief 
Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/27/nyregion/aides-
say-mcgreevey-will-seek-another-term-for-chief-justice.html?scp=8&sq=poritz&st=cse. 
Only right-wing Republicans angered by her alleged judicial activism and left-wing 
Democrats angered over her alleged lack of action on racial profiling during her tenure as 
state Attorney General withdrew their support.  
240 See Laura Craven, Corzine Names Rabner Next Chief Justice, STAR LEDGER (June 4, 
2007, 8:23 PM), http://blog.nj.com/ledgerupdates/2007/06/corzine_names_rabner 
_next_chie.html. 
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candidates241 and instead nominated his own chief counsel, who had no 
prior judicial experience. State Senator Nia H. Gill, an African-
American Democrat from Essex County, was even rumored to have 
invoked “senatorial courtesy”242 in order to block the nomination. 
Although Gill denied doing so,243 Rabner had to meet privately with the 
State Senator before a confirmation hearing could be scheduled,244 and 
she still refused to vote for his confirmation. Even though Gill was the 
only senator not to vote for Rabner,245 she and her colleagues made clear 
that they were not in Trenton simply to “rubber-stamp” the governor’s 
decisions.246 Thus, Rabner, a Democrat with little experience practicing 
law in New Jersey state courtrooms,247 began his tenure with tepid 
political support from his own party. Democratic Governor Jon Corzine, 
meanwhile, who had made Rabner his chief counsel, attorney general,248 
and then chief justice, was widely considered to be more liberal than the 
historically moderate New Jersey pols from both parties. Writing in 
Newsweek following Corzine’s 2000 election to the United States 
Senate, David Brooks listed him as one of the main reasons the election 
shifted the Senate so far to the left, even though Corzine was replacing a 
fellow Democrat.249 As governor, he did not veer from his liberal 
principles, attempting to tackle controversial social issues, such as 
increased funding for stem cell research and legalization of gay 
marriage — both of which failed.250 Chief Justice Rabner, therefore, not 
 
241 See Richard G. Jones, Nomination of Chief Justice Raises Questions in Trenton, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/14/nyregion/14justice.html.     
242
“Senatorial courtesy,” also practiced at the federal level, allows for state senators to 
block nominees (usually judges) from their home districts. Stuart Rabner lived in Caldwell, 
New Jersey, which is part of Essex County.   
243 See Laura Craven, Gill Denies Blocking Rabner, STAR-LEDGER (June 21, 2007, 3:18 
PM), http://blog.nj.com/ledgerupdates/2007/06/gill_denies_blocking_rabners_n.html.  
244 See id.  
245 See Richard G. Jones, After One Objection, Senate Confirms Corzine’s Choice for 
Chief Justice, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/22/nyregion/ 
22confirm.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1274176847-jutJNzm4uLwg+OYk9tngWg.  
246 See id.   
247 Mr. Rabner worked in New Jersey for years as a federal prosecutor in the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office for the District of New Jersey in Newark. He worked his way up to chief 
of the criminal division. But as a result, he primarily practiced law in federal court. See 
Moroz & Ung, supra note 209. 
248 Under the New Jersey Constitution, the State Attorney General is not elected but 
rather appointed by the Governor. See N.J. CONST. art. V, § IV, cl. 3.  
249 See David Brooks, Letter to the Right: Surviving the Coming Clash, NEWSWEEK, 
Dec. 25, 2000, at 61.  
250 See David Kocieniewski, Unlucky and Aloof, Corzine Fell Short of Trenton Goals, 
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only lacked the traditional political backing of the legislature but also 
had to deal with the popular conception that “governors look for people 
with generally the same ideological viewpoints when selecting justices 
for the court.”251 And this is all on top of the fact that Rabner was 
confirmed at the relatively young age of forty-six, meaning that he 
could potentially serve on the bench for more than two decades.252 
Poritz, on the other hand, was nominated at fifty-nine and knew that she 
would need to retire in 2006 on her seventieth birthday.253 Students of 
the court may not be able to discern what has ultimately led Chief 
Justice Rabner254 to embrace a more structured approach to statutory 
interpretation. But the Rabner Court’s increased citations to a “Modified 
Textualism-lite” system of statutory interpretation and reduced 
references to a statute’s underlying purpose indicate at least a 
subconscious awareness of the changing political winds in New Jersey. 
Political support for the judiciary, meanwhile, is rapidly declining 
as Governor Chris Christie, arguably the most conservative Republican 
ever to capture the governor’s mansion, battles with state Democrats 
over the future composition of the court.255 Christie sent a strong 
 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2009, at A23. In spite of mixed popular support, Governor Corzine did 
succeed in achieving his liberal goal of abolishing the death penalty in New Jersey. See Paul 
Cox, Corzine Ends Death Penalty in New Jersey, STAR LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Dec. 17, 
2007, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2007/12/nj_death_penalty_is_expected_t.html 
(“[V]oters were opposed to ending the death penalty by a margin of 53 percent to 39 
percent.”).   
251 See Wefing, Fifty Years, supra note 119, at 723.   
252 Following nomination and confirmation to a second seven-year term, a sitting justice 
can serve with good behavior until reaching the mandatory retirement age of seventy 
without needing to be re-nominated.  
253 See Brett Pulley, Lawyer at 40 Rises to Chief: Deborah Tobias Poritz, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 14, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/14/nyregion/woman-in-the-news-lawyer-
at-40-rises-to-chief-deborah-tobias-poritz.html..   
254 At a personal level, Rabner’s earlier tenure as a federal prosecutor may at least 
contribute to his more rule-based textualism. He was also working as an Assistant United 
States Attorney under then-United States Attorney Samuel Alito in Newark, New Jersey.  
255 See generally Richard Pérez-Peña, Christie’s Conservatism is not Just Economic, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2011, at A17 (quoting Ben Dworkin, director of the Rebovich Institute 
for New Jersey Politics at Rider University, as saying: “‘[Christie] is absolutely the most 
conservative governor we have had in the modern history of the state’”). The Philadelphia 
Inquirer and the New York Times both published editorials in December decrying the 
heightened politicization of the court. See Editorial, Court Battle, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 18, 
2010,  http://www.philly.com/inquirer/opinion/20101218_Inquirer_Editorial__Court_battle 
.html; Editorial, The Politicization of a Respected Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2010, at A38. 
More recently, the Wall Street Journal Law Blog published a derisive post on the matter, 
mocking New York’s “friends across the Hudson River.” See Ashby Jones, What’s Going 
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message to the judiciary by breaking with a half century of precedent 
and not re-nominating a supreme court justice following his initial 
seven-year term.256 State Democrats were particularly disturbed by this 
development since Justice John E. Wallace, Jr. was the lone African-
American on the court and would have turned seventy in two years, thus 
allowing Christie to replace him before the end of his first gubernatorial 
term. Democratic Senate President Stephen Sweeney, meanwhile, has 
refused to hold a confirmation vote on Christie’s new nominee for 
Wallace’s seat. 257 Attempting to deal with the impasse, Chief Justice 
Stuart Rabner used his state constitutional authority to make a 
temporary appointment to the bench.258 Yet the political chess match 
transformed into political warfare when Justice Roberto Rivera-Soto, a 
conservative Republican, declared that he would abstain from voting in 
any future cases since he believed Rabner’s temporary appointment was 
unconstitutional.259 Grounding his argument in the scholarly work of 
Seton Hall Law Professor Edward A. Hartnett, Rivera-Soto claims that 
the New Jersey Constitution only allows for temporary appointments 
when necessary for the constitutionally-required quorum of five 
 
on with the New Jersey Supreme Court?, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Jan. 4, 2011, 12:27 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/01/04/whats-going-on-with-the-new-jersey-supreme-court/ 
(“Take your eyes off of New Jersey for a few days and you’ll almost surely miss a strange 
political dustup or two. The latest to play out . . . involves the New Jersey Supreme Court.”). 
256 See Voreacos & Dopp, supra note 20 (“Christie’s rejection of Wallace, a Democrat, 
upended a bipartisan tradition [in New Jersey] that began after the state’s current 
Constitution was adopted in 1947. Since then, no governor has failed to reappoint a justice . 
. . even if it meant Democrats appointing Republicans and vice versa.”).     
257 See Richard Pérez-Peña , Senate President Vows to Block New Jersey Court 
Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2010, at A25. Governor Christie nominated Anne M. 
Patterson, a well-respected Republican corporate attorney from Morris County. See Richard 
Pérez-Peña , Christie, Shunning Precedent, Drops Justice from Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 
2010, at A22.   
258 See Peggy Ackerman, New Jersey Supreme Court Justice Quietly Above the Fray, 
GLOUCESTER COUNTY TIMES, Oct. 24, 2010, http://www.nj.com/gloucester/index.ssf 
?/base/news-6/1287907824123430.xml&coll=8. Justice Rabner selected another Democrat, 
intermediate appeals court Judge Edwin H. Stern. Stern, who will turn 70 in June, is not 
exempt from the mandatory retirement age. See Matt Friedman & Rohan Mascarenhas, State 
Appellate Judge is Appointed Interim N.J. Supreme Court Justice, STAR LEDGER (Newark, 
N.J.), Sept. 9, 2010, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/09/nj_supreme_court_ 
appellate_ju.html.  
259 See Lisa Fleisher & Chris Herring, Justice Stymies New Jersey High Court, WALL 
ST. J., Dec. 11, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870445760457601196 
2304920054.html?mod=googlenews_wsj (“A mini-revolt broke out on the New Jersey 
Supreme Court Friday when an associate justice said he would abstain from all future 
decisions while a temporary justice is serving, leading top Democrats to call for the 
associate justice’s resignation.”).  
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justices.260 Although the current constitutional crisis overshadows the 
debate over the future of the court’s statutory jurisprudence — 
especially as the twenty-five-year-old constitutional battle over school 
funding returns to the court’s docket in early January261 — the increasing 
politicization will undoubtedly influence future statutory decisions, 
perhaps pushing the court further along the textualist spectrum. 
B. Additional Areas for Research 
The relative lack of scholarship exploring the New Jersey Supreme 
Court’s method of statutory interpretation leaves ambitious young 
scholars with plenty of material to explore. One area in particular relates 
directly to the use of legislative history. Practitioners would greatly 
benefit from a dissection of the different types of legislative history 
used by the court in order to determine if there is any meaningful 
pattern to the seemingly arbitrary selection of sources.262 Not 
surprisingly, my research revealed that committee statements are the 
most relied-upon source of legislative history.263 Yet there is also a 
relatively high number of sponsors’ statements264 and multiple 
 
260 See Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme Court of New Jersey, 32 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 735, 768 (2001) (“[A] temporary assignment [to the New Jersey Supreme Court] 
should be made only when necessary to make a quorum. . . .”); see also James Ahearn, Op-
Ed., For Top Court Justice, a Defiant Stance, BERGEN REC., Dec. 15, 2010, 
http://www.northjersey.com/news/politics/ahearn_121510.html?c=y&page=1 (“[I]n an 
unusual attachment to a court decision on an unrelated matter, Rivera-Soto wrote that there 
was no need for the Stern appointment because the court could still muster the required 
quorum of five justices.”). 
261 The New Jersey Supreme Court scheduled the latest round of Abbott oral arguments 
for Wednesday, January 5, 2011, when the Education Law Center “is expected to seek 
restoration of full state aid in coming years under a formula designed by the Corzine 
administration in 2008” and rejected by the Christie administration in 2010. See Rita 
Giordano, Center to Fight for ‘Abbott’ Restoration, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 3, 2011,  
http://www.philly.com/inquirer/local/20110103_Center_to_fight_for__Abbott__restoration.
html.  
262 Although I made sure to record the different forms of legislative history cited in each 
case and rank the general degree to which the court relied upon legislative history as a 
whole, I did not attempt to discern the relative weight assigned to different forms of 
legislative history.  
263 See EFG LEGISLATION, supra note 40, at 311 (“Almost half the Supreme Court’s 
references to legislative history are to committee reports, and similar documents are the 
primary legislative history invoked by state courts as well.”) (citing Jorge Carro & Andrew 
Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 
22 JURIMETRICS J. 294, 304 (1982)).   
264 For a numerical tally, see the two charts listed in the Appendix. The two charts list 
twenty citations to sponsors’ statements under the Poritz Court and twelve citations to 
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references to gubernatorial signing statements,265 even though the court266 
itself has questioned the use of the latter, which are generally criticized 
as examples of “subsequent legislative history”267 developed after the 
bill has already been passed by the state legislature. 
In any future legislative history studies, scholars may also want to 
move beyond the state’s highest court. In addition to the New Jersey 
Supreme Court, the state judiciary system includes the appellate 
division and state superior trial courts.268 The former is comprised of 
thirty-five judges who hear appeals in two or three judge panels from 
the trial courts, tax court, and state administrative agencies.269 The latter 
is divided into four different divisions (Criminal, Civil, General Equity, 
and Family) that hear trials depending on the nature of the dispute and 
the requested relief.270 The sprawling trial court system may be a bit 
unwieldy for systematic scholarly analysis, but the appellate panels 
provide a definitive sample size of cases, many of which will inevitably 
involve questions of statutory interpretation. Just as Abbe Gluck 
discusses the potential for a normative discussion between state and 
federal courts grappling with different methods of statutory 
interpretation, one can easily imagine a similar conversation transpiring 
 
sponsors’ statements under the Rabner Court, for which there is a much smaller sample size 
of cases.   
265 See id. (listing ten citations to gubernatorial signing statements under the Poritz 
Court and seven citations to gubernatorial signing statements under the Rabner Court). 
266 See Owens v. Feigin, 194 N.J. 607, 617 n.3 (2008) (“In the hierarchy of legislative 
history, signing statements do not carry the interpretive force afforded to statements from 
the Legislature.”) (citations omitted). In Owens, on top of the gubernatorial signing 
statement, the court also looked to sponsor and committee statements. When issuing signing 
statements, New Jersey governors send out press releases that the court will directly cite. 
See, e.g., R.A.C. v. P.J.S., Jr., 192 N.J. 81, 94 (2007); State v. D.A., 191 N.J. 158, 169 
(2007) (“Indeed, the press release issued at the bill’s passage explains that the amendment 
‘[e]stablishes a new crime for any person who attempts to hinder his own apprehension, 
prosecution or conviction by concealing evidence, intimidating witnesses, or by giving false 
information to a police officer.’ Press Release, Acting Governor Joseph P. Merlino, Senate 
Bill No. 1537 (Sept. 24, 1981).”). 
267 See EFG LEGISLATION, supra note 40, at 316. 
268 See An Overview of the Court Process, N.J. JUDICIARY, http://www.judiciary 
.state.nj.us/nj_overview.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2011). The New Jersey judicial system 
also includes local municipal courts and a tax court, which is a court of limited jurisdiction 
with twelve judges. See Tax Court of New Jersey, N.J. JUDICIARY, http://www.judiciary 
.state.nj.us/taxcourt/index.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2011). 
269 See Superior Court, Appellate Division, N.J. JUDICIARY, http://www.judiciary 
.state.nj.us/appdiv/index.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).   
270 See Local Courts in Your County, N.J. JUDICIARY, http://www.judiciary 
.state.nj.us/trial.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).   
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between intermediate state courts and the New Jersey Supreme Court.271 
Yet the sheer absence of statutory interpretation scholarship at the 
intermediate level prevents the supreme court justices from having any 
sense of evolving trends in the lower courts.272 The development of 
methodological patterns at the lower level may help the justices 
formulate their own interpretive approaches. On the other hand, the 
justices may want to get a better sense of whether or not their 
methodologies, such as the use of the Funnel of Abstraction or shift 
towards Modified Textualism-lite, are being followed by their 
counterparts in the appellate division.273 
Another related topic is the extent to which the court defers to state 
agencies. In a number of opinions, the court made a point of 
highlighting the traditional deference owed to an agency’s interpretation 
of a statute but did not appear to follow any New Jersey-specific 
regime.274 In their comprehensive study of the United State Supreme 
Court’s Chevron jurisprudence, William Eskridge and Lauren Baer have 
demonstrated that judges may ascribe to their own deference regime in 
theory but then fail to apply it in practice.275 Although I noted instances 
in which the court at least paid lip service to agency interpretations,276 I 
 
271 See Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 129, at 193 (citations 
omitted) (raising the prospect that the courts could “embrace a ‘dialectical federalism’ for 
statutory interpretation — a conversation between state and federal courts that could shape 
the evolution of interpretive doctrine itself”). 
272 For one notable exception, see Judith H. Wizmur, Judge Michael Patrick King: 
Judicial Orientation as Reflected by Statutory Construction, 35 RUTGERS L.J. xv (2004) 
(analyzing the statutory jurisprudence of Judge Michael Patrick King, who served on the 
New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, from 1975-2004). 
273 See Gluck, supra note 129, at 193-95 (discussing the potential for cross fertilization 
of interpretive methodologies between the state courts and the federal courts). 
274 See, e.g., N.J. Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep’t of Agric., 
196 N.J. 366, 385 (2008) (upholding the Department of Agriculture’s regulations regarding 
the treatment of veal calves and the transportation of sick or downed animals).   
275 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: 
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 
GEO. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008) (finding that Chevron deference “was applied in only 8.3% of 
Supreme Court cases evaluating agency statutory interpretations”).  
276 See, e.g., In re Election Law Enforcement Comm’n Advisory Op., 201 N.J. 254, 262 
(2010) (“Generally, an appellate court should give considerable weight to a state agency’s 
interpretation of a statutory scheme that the legislature has entrusted to the agency to 
administer. This deference comes from the understanding that a state agency brings 
experience and specialized knowledge to its task of administering and regulating a 
legislative enactment within its field of expertise. Moreover, regulations promulgated by an 
agency in furtherance of a statutory scheme it is charged with enforcing are presumed to be 
valid. We will defer to an agency’s interpretation of both a statute and implementing 
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did not attempt to measure the degree to which the court actually 
deferred to them.277 The question of deference not only applies to this 
Article’s narrow focus on legislative history (both function as extrinsic 
sources capable of shedding light on the statutory text under review) but 
also to the New Jersey Supreme Court as a whole, due to the court’s 
reputation for independence. Thus, further study into the relative 
influence of different forms of legislative history and state agency 
interpretations will help reveal where the court stands on the spectrum 
between independent institutional entity and legislative/executive 
relational agent. For example, highly deferential acceptance of 
executive agency statutory interpretations, coupled with heavy reliance 
on gubernatorial signing statements, would indicate a greater awareness 
of the executive branch — and its power of appointment. Whereas 
minimal reliance on sponsors’ statements, floor colloquies, and rejected 
amendment proposals might reveal the court’s greater sense of 
independence vis-à-vis the state legislature.278 
At a more meta-level of analysis, this Article also raises the 
question of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s future approach to 
constitutional interpretation. As discussed in Part VII infra, the court’s 
Brennan-esque fame comes from its constitutional law holdings. Yet the 
court’s fairly pragmatic approach to statutory interpretation over the 
past decade — in which even the more purpose-driven Poritz Court 
afforded great weight to statutory text — may call into question the 
court’s role in the state’s separation-of-powers balancing act. The 
 
regulation, within the sphere of the agency’s authority, unless the interpretation is ‘plainly 
unreasonable.” (citations omitted)).  
277 Although uncommon, neither the Rabner Court nor the Poritz Court was afraid to 
reject agency interpretations. See, e.g., Reilly v. AAA Mid-Atlantic Ins. Co. of N.J., 194 
N.J. 474, 478 (2008) (holding that the Department of Banking and Insurance “applied its 
regulations in a manner that exceed[ed] the scope of its statutory authority”); In re 
Freshwater Wetlands Prot. Act Rules, 180 N.J. 478, 491 (2004) (holding that the 
Department of Environmental Protection exceeded its authority when it adopted rules 
regulating the development of residential projects). 
278 Any additional research into the uses of legislative history and, more specifically, 
into the question of the court’s deference, or lack thereof, to the state legislature, should also 
include a more detailed analysis of the state legislative process. If judges claim they are 
deferring to legislators, they should make sure they understand the intricacies of the 
legislative process, including any deliberate attempts on the part of legislators and their 
staffers to leave language ambiguous. Thus, all parties would benefit from a study similar to 
that conducted by Victoria Nourse and Jane Schacter at the federal level in which the two 
scholars did an empirical study of the Senate Judiciary Committee’s legislative drafting 
process. See Victoria Nourse & Jane Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A 
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 576-77 (2002). 
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court’s recent decision not to revisit the gay marriage issue, written by 
Chief Justice Rabner, may be indicative of a more restrained 
constitutional role.279 Only four years earlier, prior to the appointment of 
Chief Justice Rabner, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the law 
banning same-sex marriage violated the equal protection provisions of 
the New Jersey Constitution.280 Yet the court allowed the legislature to 
choose between amending the marriage statute to include same-sex 
couples or passing a statute allowing for civil unions that conferred on 
same-sex couples the same rights, benefits, and obligations of civil 
marriage.281 The legislature chose the latter, and four years later, six 
same-sex couples brought suit.282 The plaintiffs alleged that they had 
been denied the full rights and benefits the court had earlier ruled were 
guaranteed to them under the New Jersey Constitution.283 Citing an 
insufficient trial record, Chief Justice Rabner wrote the decision 
denying the motion for rehearing. Although he did not reject the 
application outright, Rabner bought the court time, perhaps hoping the 
legislature will intervene before the issue works its way back up to the 
court. Rabner supporters may argue that the Chief Justice was faced 
with a more monumental decision in that he could not split the 
difference as his predecessors did in 2006. Therefore, his denial may not 
be indicative of a reduced constitutional role for the court. Yet in 
regards to the issue of gay marriage, the year 2006 seems like ancient 
 
279 See Associated Press, New Jersey Supreme Court Declines Gay Marriage Case, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2010, at A17 (noting that the court did not outright reject the 
application but rather called for the case to first be argued in the trial court); see also Lewis 
v. Harris, 202 N.J. 340, 340 (2010) (“This matter cannot be decided without the 
development of an appropriate trial-like record. Plaintiffs’ motion is therefore denied 
without prejudice to plaintiffs filing an action in Superior Court and seeking to create a 
record there. We reach no conclusion on the merits of plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the 
constitutionality of the Civil Union Act, N.J.S.A. 37:1-28 to -36.”).   
280 See Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415, 422 (2006) (citing N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 1). The 
court did note, however, that it could not “find that a right to same-sex marriage is so deeply 
rooted in the traditions, history, and conscience of the people of this State that it ranks as a 
fundamental right.” Id. at 441.   
281 Id. at 423 (“The name to be given to the statutory scheme that provides full rights 
and benefits to same-sex couples, whether marriage or some other term, is a matter left to 
the democratic process.”). 
282 Editorial, N.J.’s Gay Marriage Debate: Back to Court because Lawmakers Failed, 
STAR LEDGER (Mar. 24, 2010, 5:26 AM), http://blog.nj.com/njv_editorial_page/2010 
/03/nj_gay_marriage_back_to_court.html (discussing the decision by gay rights 
organizations to ask the court to “reopen the case” following the bill’s demise in the 
legislature).  
283 See Lewis v. Harris, 202 N.J. at 340.   
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history. Given all that has taken place across the country over the past 
four years,284 not to mention the fact that the earlier decision provided 
the necessary legal framework for granting marriage equality, Rabner 
could have at least allowed for oral arguments. Regardless of the 
underlying reasoning driving his decision,285 Rabner exhibited the same 
mild restraint in the constitutional realm that his court has demonstrated 
in the statutory realm. 
C. “Exogenous Shocks” 
Systemic studies of the court’s historical use of legislative history 
and application of deference will also help determine the degree to 
which Christie’s election as governor and subsequent nominations to the 
court represent what Harvard Law Professor Adrian Vermeule refers to 
as “exogenous shocks” to the judicial system.286 That is not to say that 
Christie and his judicial picks are going to have a negligible impact on 
the future of the court’s approach to statutory interpretation. But such 
factors may only be playing a role, albeit a leading one, in the overall 
interpretive drama of methodological cycling.287 Chronicling the 
 
284 Since the court’s 2006 ruling, gay marriage has been legalized in Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Iowa. See Maria Godoy, State by State: The 
Legal Battle over Gay Marriage, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, Dec. 15, 2009, http://www.npr.org 
/templates/story/story.php?storyId=112448663; see also John Schwartz, Despite Setback, 
Gay Rights Move Forward, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2010, at A18 (highlighting the fact that 
“two laws restricting gay rights — the federal Defense of Marriage Act and the California 
ban on same-sex marriage — have been declared unconstitutional by federal judges in 
recent months”); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs Away ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 22, 2010,  http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/23/us/politics/23military 
.html?scp=4&sq=dont%20ask%20dont%20tell&st=cse (marking the end of the ban on gays 
and lesbians serving openly in the military).     
285 See Bob Braun, N.J. Supreme Court’s Refusal to Hear Gay Marriage Case Raises 
Question of Christie’s Influence, STAR LEDGER (Aug. 16, 2010, 10:35 AM),  
http://blog.nj.com/njv_bob_braun/2010/08/nj_supreme_court_justices_who.html (discussing 
the possibility that Chief Justice Stuart Rabner and Justices Roberto Rivera-Soto and Helen 
Hoens voted against rehearing because they are all subject to reappointment by Governor 
Chris Christie, who has openly expressed his opposition to gay marriage); see also Mary 
Fuchs, N.J. Gubernatorial Candidates Address Social Issues, Including Medical Marijuana, 
Gay Marriage, STAR LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Oct. 8, 2009, http://www.nj.com/news/ 
index.ssf/2009/10/nj_gubernatorial_candidates_ad_1.html (“I think civil unions are strong 
and I think they’re good and I’m a supporter of civil unions and the civil union law in New 
Jersey. But I am not a supporter of same-sex marriage.”).      
286 See Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 
149, 181 (2001). 
287 There is clearly a difference between short-term shifts and long-term developments 
in interpretive methodology. Exogenous events may appear to have a greater impact on 
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evolution of the United States Supreme Court’s treatment of general 
statutory commands,288 Vermeule moves beyond “exogenous 
disturbances” to examine the internal behavior of repeat players within 
the system. Vermeule provides the example of “judicial recourse” to 
legislative history, an interpretive maneuver that may cause elected 
officials to manipulate legislative history, leading judges to refrain from 
referencing it out of fear that it is corrupted, thereby causing legislators 
to stop manipulating it, in turn leading judges to reference it again.289 
Thus, the slight but perceptible shift between the Poritz and Rabner 
Courts may just be a natural reflection of “a cyclical pattern of 
continuous mutual adjustment,” which “never reaches a stable 
equilibrium.”290 The precise crossover influence of the judicial, 
legislative, and executive branches is difficult to determine, but the 
system’s internal mechanisms may be driving an endless cycle of 
interpretive adjustment that cannot just be explained by external 
influences, such as gubernatorial elections and judicial nominations. 
Although I cannot declare without further study that disequilibrium is 
endemic to the court’s approach to statutory interpretation, I can say 
that it is something future scholars should take into account in 
attempting to assess the court’s methodology — both historically and 
during the Christie-era. 
VII. NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT JUSTICE WILLIAM 
BRENNAN: MODERATE CHAMPION 
The New Jersey Supreme Court has the honorable distinction of 
being the last state court to send one of its members directly to the 
United States Supreme Court. On September 29, 1956, President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower nominated New Jersey Supreme Court Associate 
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. to fill Justice Sherman Minton’s vacated 
 
short-term shifts, but such events may be an outgrowth of long-term, internal developments.   
288 Vermeule’s cyclical example highlights turning points at Church of the Holy Trinity 
v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892) (“flexible treatment of general statutory prohibition”); 
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) and Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55 
(1930) (“both of which pronounced that clear statutory text is all-but-conclusive evidence of 
legislative intent”); United States v. American Trucking Assocs., Inc., 310 U.S. 534 (1940) 
(“return to purposive interpretation, saturated by extrinsic sources”); United States v. Locke, 
471 U.S. 84 (1985), Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564 (1982); and TVA v. 
Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (moving toward a “direction of greater formality in famously 
literalist decisions”). Vermeule, supra note 286, at 183-84.   
289 Vermeule, supra note 286, at 152.  
290 Id.  
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seat on the United States Supreme Court.291 Brennan, largely selected 
based on his religious and political affiliations, would go on to serve as 
one of the United State Supreme Court’s leading liberals in the second 
half of the twentieth century.292 In the realm of statutory interpretation, 
he authored major purpose-driven opinions in cases such as Weber293 
and K Mart.294 Brennan, who served as an Associate Justice for thirty-
four years, is generally considered to be “the most forceful and effective 
liberal ever to serve on the [United States Supreme] Court.”295 Yet 
Brennan’s early judicial tenure in New Jersey ⎯ and not his later work 
in Washington ⎯ better reflects the current state of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court’s statutory jurisprudence. 
Brennan’s short and fairly non-ideological tenure on the New 
Jersey Supreme Court was marked more by courtroom efficiency than 
controversial decisions.296 Chief Justice Vanderbilt primarily admired 
Brennan for his ability to move cases rapidly through the court system297 
 
291 President Names Jersey Democrat to Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1956, at 
1.  
292 Having already made two Republican appointments during his first term and facing 
what appeared at the time to be a strong re-challenge from Adlai Stevenson, Eisenhower 
sought to burnish his bipartisan credentials and try to win over Catholic Democrats in 
advance of the 1956 presidential election. See KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALL 89 
(1993); SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 74-75 
(2010) (describing the pressure by leading Catholics, including Francis Joseph Cardinal 
Spellman, the archbishop of the Catholic Archdiocese of New York, to maintain the 
“Catholic seat” that had been lost upon the death of Justice Fran Murphy in 1949); see also 
FRANK I. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY 64 (1999) (describing Justice Brennan’s 
democratic liberalism). 
293 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979). See ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION,  supra note 26, at 15 (“Justice William Brennan’s opinion for 
the Court slighted the original legislative intent and focused instead on the consistency of 
voluntary affirmative action with the ‘spirit’ and ‘purpose’ of the statute.” (emphasis 
added)).   
294 K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 295 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
See ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 26, at 117 (describing 
Brennan’s reasoning, Eskridge writes: “Since Congress’s core purpose in 1922 was to 
prevent importers from cheating the American holder out of its bargained-for rights, the 
legislators would probably have excepted common control situations had they presented 
themselves” (emphasis added)). 
295 STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 292, at xiii. 
296 On a related note, out of the hundreds of cases Brennan handled as a judge in the 
New Jersey judicial system, only three “turned on the resolution of a federal question, and in 
all three that question was statutory.” William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the 
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 490 (1977) [hereinafter Brennan, 
State Constitutions].   
297 See EISLER, supra note 292, at 82. 
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and generally tapped him to make mundane speeches about New Jersey 
state court reform.298 Brennan’s activist jurisprudence299 on the nation’s 
highest court, therefore, should not and cannot be viewed as a mere 
continuation of his work on the state’s highest court.300 It was not until 
long after Brenan had ascended to the United States Supreme Court that 
he wrote his infamous federalism article in the Harvard Law Review.301 
The Justice’s focus on state constitutionalism as a means for protecting 
individual rights, moreover, is indicative of the distinction that must be 
made between the New Jersey Supreme Court’s constitutional 
jurisprudence and statutory jurisprudence.302 Regardless of whether the 
New Jersey Supreme Court merits its activist reputation303 due to its 
creative constitutionalism, the reputation does not fit with the court’s 
more formulaic statutory opinions.304 Brennan may have noted an uptick 
 
298 See STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 292, at 66 (noting that Brennan “had become 
Vanderbilt’s public relations man, trumpeting New Jersey’s court reforms to audiences 
throughout the state and beyond”).   
299 As a United States Supreme Court Justice, “Brennan interpreted the Constitution 
expansively to broaden rights as well as create new ones for minorities, women, the poor, 
and the press . . . . In the process, he came to embody an assertive vision for the courts in 
which judges aggressively tackled the nation’s most complicated and divisive social 
problems.” STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 292, at xiii. 
300 See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Supreme Court Judge Versus United 
States Supreme Court Justice: A Change in Function and Perspective, 19 U. FLA. L. REV. 
225 (1966) (discussing the different judicial responsibilities of those serving on state 
supreme courts, as opposed to on the United States Supreme Court).  
301 Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 296, at 489. 
302 See id. at 491 (“But the point I want to stress here is that state courts cannot rest 
when they have afforded their citizens the full protections of the federal Constitution. State 
constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond 
those required by the [United States] Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law.” 
(emphasis added)). 
303 See Kevin M. Mulcahy, Note, Modeling the Garden: How New Jersey Built the Most 
Progressive State Supreme Court and What California Can Learn, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
863, 863 (1999) (focusing on “the New Jersey Supreme Court, which stands as arguably the 
most activist, progressive, and, especially in area of individual rights, important state 
supreme court” in the nation). 
304 For an example of such creative constitutionalism, see Brennan’s discussion of the 
New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349 (1975) (expanding 
the fourth amendment right against illegal searches through a broad reading of the state 
constitution’s analogous provision, which contained nearly identical language to that of the 
original Bill of Rights). Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 296, at 499 (referencing 
N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 7) (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue except upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and the papers and things to be seized.”); see 
also Brennan, supra, at 501 (discussing S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount 
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in expansive readings of state constitutions by state supreme courts 
eager to counter an increasingly conservative United States Supreme 
Court. Yet neither he, nor any other scholar since, has noted a similar 
attempt by state supreme court justices to take such a decidedly 
expansive approach to statutory interpretation.305 
Brennan’s moderate tenure on the New Jersey Supreme Court also 
raises the broader normative question of whether conservative critics of 
the court are more interested in decisional outcome or interpretive 
methodology. In his characterization of the Poritz Court’s performance 
during the first five years of the Chief Justice’s term, Professor Wefing 
concludes that she was carrying on the court’s liberal and progressive 
tradition.306 Yet Wefing largely bases his definition of the term “liberal” 
on general issue-based concerns and results — and not on a particular 
method of jurisprudence, either in the constitutional or statutory realm.307 
Although Wefing highlights what he perceived to be the Poritz Court’s 
tendency to read the Constitution liberally in order to expand individual 
rights, he primarily focuses on the court’s signature issues, such as 
school funding and affordable housing.308 Ultimately, Wefing initiates a 
broader discussion of what it means to be a progressive court and 
whether Governor Christie is more concerned with methodological 
consistency or conservative outcomes. Therefore, Christie’s pledge to 
overhaul the “activist” court does not inevitably pave a path towards 
stricter textualism since the newly constituted conservative court may 
not like the statutes passed by the liberal-leaning legislature. Some form 
 
Laurel, 67 N.J. 151 (1975), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975)) 
(praising the New Jersey Supreme Court’s “now famous Mt. Laurel decision,” not only for 
its result but also for its preclusion from review by the United States Supreme Court due to 
its grounding in state constitutional law). 
305 See Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 296, at 495 (“Of late, however, more 
and more state courts are construing state constitutional counterparts of provisions of the 
Bill of Rights as guaranteeing citizens of their states even more protection than the federal 
provisions, even those identically phrased.”).   
306 See Wefing, Performance, supra note 114, at 771 (“[D]espite the significant change 
in membership, the Poritz Court has essentially continued the progressive, independent, and 
generally liberal approach of the Wilentz court.”). Chief Justice Robert Wilentz served from 
1979 to 1996 and was succeeded by Chief Justice Poritz. See id. at 770. 
307 See id. at 771 (“While the word liberal can have many different meanings, for 
purposes of this article, it reflects society’s current perception of the emphasis on individual 
rights, expansive views of defendant’s rights, opposition to the death penalty, support for a 
woman’s right to choose, opposition to all forms of discrimination, broad protection of 
freedom of speech, and concern for the less powerful members of society, as represented by 
students in poor school districts, consumers, employees, and plaintiffs.” (citations omitted)). 
308 Id. at 769-70 (citations omitted).   
YOFFIE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2011  7:35 PM 
356 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL Vol. 35:2 
of Gluck’s Modified Textualism may actually still reign, with the 
methodological battle revolving around the presence or absence of 
textual ambiguity.309 
CONCLUSION 
The Poritz Court was more Dworkinian310 than its Rabner-led 
successor; its greater comfort with a purpose-driven approach is evident 
in one of the most controversial decisions authored by Chief Justice 
Poritz.311 In New Jersey State Democratic Party v. Samson,312 a bitterly 
contested case with national implications, the court had to interpret New 
Jersey election law to determine if the State Democratic Party could 
replace Senator Robert Torricelli on the ballot following his withdrawal 
five weeks before the 2002 election.313 After outlining the basic facts of 
the case, Poritz opened the unanimous decision by quoting Chief Justice 
Vanderbilt: “Election laws are to be liberally construed so as to 
 
309 In their Yale Law Journal Online response to Gluck’s article, supra note 47, Ethan 
Leib and Michael Serota criticize Modified Textualism for merely “replac[ing] the 
traditional debate over the most appropriate application of legitimate interpretive techniques 
with a new battle over textual ambiguity.” Leib & Serota, supra note 69, at 58. 
310 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 345-46 (1986) (“A community of 
principle does not see legislation the way a rulebook community does, as negotiated 
compromises that carry no more or deeper meaning than the text of the statute declares; it 
treats legislation as flowing from the community’s present commitment to a background 
scheme of political morality. The practice of legislative history, of formal declarations of 
general institutional purpose and convictions made on behalf of the state itself, expresses 
and confirms that attitude.”). 
311 Compare Angelo J. Genova & Jennifer Mazawey, In the Election of 2002, The 
Voters of New Jersey were the Winners, 27 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 77, 78 (2002) (praising the 
decision for “preserve[ing] the integrity of the New Jersey electoral system, including the 
fundamental right of voters to exercise the franchise in a meaningful fashion”) with William 
E. Baroni, Jr., Administrative Unfeasibility: The Torricelli Replacement Case and the 
Creation of a New Election Law Standard, 27 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 53, 72 (2002) 
(criticizing the decision for “open[ing] the door to an entirely new area of election law 
litigation”). 
312 N.J. State Democratic Party v. Samson, 175 N.J. 178, 183 (2002). 
313 New Jersey Democratic Senator Robert G. Torricelli withdrew from his reelection 
bid due to increasing pressure from state and national Democratic leaders after he was 
admonished by the Senate Ethics Committee for “failing to disclose expensive gifts from a 
former contributor to whom he repeatedly gave help.” Tim Golden, Ethics Committee Faults 
Torricelli on Gift Violations, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2002,   http://www.nytimes. 
com/2002/07/31/nyregion/ethics-committee-faults-torricelli-on-gift-violations.html?scp= 
7&sq=torricelli&st=cse (“The committee’s action [came] six months after federal 
prosecutors ended a lengthy criminal investigation into Mr. Torricelli’s activities without 
filing criminal charges.”).  
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effectuate their purpose.”314 The Chief Justice then proceeded to cite 
another earlier election law decision, in which the court based its 
decision on the context of the statute, instead of on its text.315 Only then 
did Poritz address the statute’s text, which deals with vacancies that 
“occur not later than the 51st day before the general election” and in the 
event of such an occurrence allows for the selection of replacements 
“not later than the 48th day preceding the date of the general election.”316 
Senator Torricelli, however, withdrew thirty-six days before the 
election, thereby falling outside of the statutory window.317 Ultimately 
ruling in favor of the Democratic Party, Poritz partially grounded her 
reasoning in statutes from other states that explicitly address what 
officials should do when such a vacancy arises outside of the statutory 
timeline — thus highlighting the absence of a similar mandate in New 
Jersey’s statute.318 The Chief Justice explained that when the legislature 
“has not explicitly addressed the issue . . . the Court must consider the 
‘fundamental purpose’ of the enactment . . . .”319 
Nonetheless, Poritz’s penchant for consulting a wider array of 
sources in the face of clear statutory text (or in rare instances, 
disregarding the text altogether)320 does not mean that she was 
 
314 N.J. Democratic Party, 175 N.J. at 186 (citing Kilmurray v. Gilfert, 10 N.J. 435, 440 
(1952)). 
315 Id. at 189 (citing Wene v. Meyner, 13 N.J. 185, 197 (1953) (“A statute is not to be 
given an arbitrary construction, according to the strict letter, but rather one that will advance 
the sense and meaning fairly deducible from the context.”)). 
316 Id. at 191 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:13-20 (West 2002)) (“In the event of a 
vacancy, howsoever caused, among candidates nominated at primaries, which vacancy shall 
occur not later than the 51st day before the general election . .  . a candidate shall be selected 
in the following manner: a. (1) In the case of an office to be filled by the voters of the entire 
State, the candidate shall be selected by the State committee of the political party wherein 
such vacancy occurred . . . . A selection made pursuant to this section shall be made not later 
than the 48th day preceding the date of the general election . . . .”).  
317 The oral arguments before the New Jersey Supreme Court took place on October 2, 
2002 — 34 days before the November 5, 2002 general election. See Genova & Mazawey, 
supra note 311, at 78-79. 
318 N.J. Democratic Party, 175 N.J. at 193 n.5 (discussing similar statutes in Alabama, 
Kansas, Pennsylvania, Michigan and Minnesota). 
319 Id. at 194 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Chief Justice Poritz also cited 
legislative history, specifically the Assembly Committee Statement to the 1985 
amendments. See id. She also added in a footnote: “We observe that the Legislature is 
presumed to be aware of judicial construction of its enactments. Our cases repeatedly have 
construed the election laws liberally, consonant with their purpose and with practical 
considerations related to process.” Id. at 195 n.6 (citation omitted).   
320 See, e.g., Smith v. Fireworks by Girone, Inc., 180 N.J. 199 (2004) (ruling in favor of 
a child injured by left-over fireworks in spite of admitting that its decision did not fit with 
YOFFIE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2011  7:35 PM 
358 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL Vol. 35:2 
attempting to usurp the legislative power from the state’s elected 
officials. Poritz’s purposivism represented a collaborative vision in 
which the court and the legislature were supposed to act as partners. 
Three years into his tenure, Chief Justice Rabner has not rejected that 






























the actual words of the statute). “It is the proper function, indeed the obligation, of the 
judiciary to give effect to the obvious purpose of the Legislature, and to that end ‘words 
used may be expanded or limited according to the manifest reason and obvious purpose of 
the law. The spirit of the legislative direction prevails over the literal sense of the terms.”‘ 
Id. at 216 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).     
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